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ABSTRACT 
This thesis examines the concept of parental liability and the effect it has in deterring juvenile 
delinquency, with an emphasis on Florida Law.  It will also consider the concept‟s ability to 
properly compensate victims of juvenile offenses.  The thesis focuses on the circumstances in 
which a parent or guardian may be liable for the actions of a child and how liability insurance 
law plays a key role in compensating innocent victims.  It discusses Florida‟s public policy of 
seeking justice by holding parents responsible and the problems that it faces by doing so.  The 
thesis further examines what issues arise when parents are found vicariously liable for their 
negligence or contribution to a child‟s offense, but are not covered by liability insurance 
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1 
CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Renowned American author Robert Fulghum once stated: 
“Don't worry that children never listen to you; worry that they are always watching you.”
1
 
There are popular quotes which should echo in parents‟ minds; “With great power comes great 
responsibility” is an often overused, but essential concept that needs to be analyzed and 
understood by parents.  Unfortunately, there are many cases where this simple concept is 
mistakenly overlooked.  As people, who among us possesses more power over an individual than 
a parent over his or her child?  In this thesis „parent‟ refers to any guardian of a child, whether an 
aunt, uncle, sibling, grandparent or any other court appointed individual. 
We all love our children.  They are miniature sculptures of their parents and should represent 
everything good about society.  Many parents work relentlessly to ensure brighter futures for 
their children, yet rarely do parents really ask themselves “What kind of example am I setting for 
my kids?” 
Juvenile delinquency rates and crimes are always at the forefront of community issues that need 
to be addressed.  Whether the juvenile crime rate rises or drops, society‟s focus should not be on 
where the rate stands, it should be on why it exists.  Society may want to reconsider the mindset 
that juvenile crimes simply happen and analyze the common assumption that these occurrences 
are part of the typical „growing pains‟ that are involved in any child‟s maturing process.  
Criminal acts committed by children should not be considered growing pains.  It seems that 
society may have come to accept that the simple motto „kids will be kids‟ has evolved into more 
                                                 
1
 GoodReads Inc. (2011). Robert Fulghum Quotes. Retrieved April 13, 2011, from GoodReads.com: 
http://www.goodreads.com/author/quotes/19630.Robert_Fulghum 
2 
than just petty acts of rebellion against parents, but also for acts which clearly violate the law.  
Whether a child commits petty theft or murder, society should reanalyze justifying such offenses 
that a child “could not understand the significance of his or her actions.”  It is important that 
parents instill values of what is, and is not, acceptable for their child.  Figures one (1) and two (2) 
in Appendix A show relevant data collected by the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency 
Prevention regarding the arrest and property damage rates of juvenile delinquents from 1980 to 
2008.
2
  This data demonstrates society‟s juvenile delinquency problem and, as such, these 
delinquency rates should be taken into consideration when society decides to take action to deter 
delinquent actions. 
Unfortunately, solving the problems of delinquency may require more than the traditional form 
of punishing the child as a means of deterrence.  It might also be necessary to impose liability 
onto the parents or guardians.  Far too many courts, as well as family and youth services 
agencies, have either undervalued or ignored the role parents play in their children‟s severe 
misbehavior and what can and should be done about it.
3
  Imposing parental liability may be a 
useful method used to decrease juvenile delinquency, while also addressing society‟s moral duty 
to compensate innocent victims. 
Parental Liability Origin: A Dark Moment in History 
“I have a goal to destroy as much as possible, and I must not be sidetracked by my feelings of 
sympathy, mercy or any of that,” Eric Harris wrote in one of his journal entries, six months prior 
                                                 
2
 Puzzanchera, C. (2008). Juvenile Arrests 2008. Juvenile Justice Bulletin, at 6-7. 
3
 Davidson, H. (Winter 1995-1996). No Consequences - Re-examining Parental Responsibility Laws. Stanford Law 
and Policy Review, Rev. 23., at 23. 
3 
to the incident at Columbine High School in Littleton Colorado on April 20, 1999.
4
  For those of 
us who remember this tragedy, those words alone send shivers down our spines.  Two juvenile 
assailants took fifteen innocent lives.  Why did it happen?  Was it foreseeable?  Could it have 
been prevented?  Although Columbine was the deadliest criminal activity committed by 
juveniles in America, it was not the only instance of children embarking on killing sprees.  In 
October 1997, in Pearl, Mississippi a sixteen year-old boy killed his mother through brutal 
stabbings and went on to shoot nine of his classmates, killing two of them.
5
  In West Paducah, 
Kentucky, during a morning church prayer session eight students were shot, three of them killed, 
by a fourteen year-old boy who was later tried and received a life sentence.
6
  On May 21, 1998, 
in Springfield, Oregon, a fifteen year-old shot twenty students (killing two) at his high school.  
That same fifteen year-old murderer had already killed both of his parents on the morning of his 
rampage.
7
  On March 24, 1998 in Jonesboro, Arkansas two teenage boys, age eleven and 
thirteen, staged a false fire alarm at their middle school and then started shooting at the exiting 
crowd.  They killed four female students and a teacher.
8
  Events like these are the reason why 
society cannot overlook the tragedy that may occur when children have problems which are 
ignored.  These situations occur when parents are not involved in the lives of their children and 
fail to supervise them.  Following the Columbine tragedy, President Clinton addressed the 
public: 
                                                 
4
 Johnson, K. (2006, July 7). Journals Reveal Ruminations of Teenage Columbine Killers. The New York Times, at 
14. 
5
 Belkin, L. (1999). Parents Blaming Parents. The New York Times, at 61. 
6
 Id. at 61. 
7
 Barron, J., & Sink, M. (1999). Chronology: Other Shootings Involving Students. The New York Times, at A17. 
8
 Id. at A17. 
4 
I want to begin by saying that Hillary and I are profoundly shocked and saddened 
by the tragedy today in Littleton, where two students opened fire on their 
classmates before apparently turning their guns on themselves… 
I think that Patricia Holloway would not mind if I said that amidst all of the 
turmoil and grief that she and others are experiencing, she said to me just a 
moment ago that perhaps now America would wake up to the dimensions of this 
challenge if it could happen in a place like Littleton and we could prevent 
anything like this from happening again. We pray that she is right. 
We don‟t know yet all the hows or whys of this tragedy. Perhaps we may never 
fully understand it. St. Paul reminds us that we all see things in this life through a 
glass darkly, that we only partly understand what is happening. 
We do know that we must do more to reach out to our children and teach them to 
express their anger and to resolve their conflicts with words, not weapons. And 
we do know we have to do more to recognize the early warning signs that are sent 
before children act violently.
9
 
Several parents of the fifteen victims who died took legal action against the parents of the two 
assailants, Eric Harris and Dylan Klebold.  They sought damages of $250 million based on 
claims of failure of supervision and lack of preventive measures taken by the parents.
10
  
Colorado statutes limit monetary damages against parents who are found civilly liable for the 
acts of their children to $5,000.
11
  The plaintiffs planned to sue under a related statute that 
extended the limit on monetary relief for negligence and wrongful death to $250,000 unless the 
court finds justification by clear and convincing evidence to extend the limit to $500,000.
12
  The 
                                                 
9
 Colorado School Shooting: All Four Students at Swedish Medical Center Awake, Coherent. (1999, April 21). CNN 
Live Event/Special . United States: CNN television broadcast. 
10
 Belkin, supra note 5, at 61.  After the initial filing of the lawsuit Geoffrey Fieger was alerted to the fact that 
Colorado prohibits plaintiffs from putting an expected dollar figure on their recovery amount, and the lawsuit had to 
be re-filed.  Fieger claimed that the error was a mistake although some suggest that it was done as gamesmanship 
and that Fieger was attempting to influence prospective jurors. 
11
 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-21-107 (Lexis 2010). 
12
 Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. 13-21-102.5 (Lexis 2010).  The statute reads, in relevant part: 
(1) The general assembly finds, determines, and declares that awards in civil actions for noneconomic losses or 
injuries often unduly burden the economic, commercial, and personal welfare of persons in this state; therefore, 
for the protection of the public peace, health, and welfare, the general assembly enacts this section placing 
monetary limitations on such damages for noneconomic losses or injuries. 
(2) As used in this section: 
5 
plaintiffs argued that the damage limits of the aforementioned statutes were unconstitutional.
13
  
In their answer, both defendants claimed to have been unaware of their children‟s activities.  In 
support of defendant parent‟s denial during trial, there was a videotape submitted into evidence 
of Dylan Klebold staring into the camera and stating, “[L]et me tell you this much, [the 
defendants] have no clue… [D]on‟t blame them and arrest them for what we did.”
14
  The 
plaintiffs argued that it would have been nearly impossible for the defendants not to have known 
of their sons‟ year-long building and exploding of bombs. 
The case was settled out of court.  Although the aforementioned Colorado Statutes are still valid 
today, as of 2009 the plaintiffs have successfully recovered over $2 million of insurance money 
from the Klebold and Harris families.
15
  In total, the parents of the killers, the sheriff‟s office, 
and the gun supplier have paid out over $4 million in settlement money.  This settlement was 
divided among dozens of individual litigants.
16
  This seems to be a reasonable settlement, since 
                                                                                                                                                             
(a) “Derivative noneconomic losses or injury” means nonpecuniary harm for which damages are 
recoverable by the person suffering the direct or primary loss or injury. 
(b) “Noneconomic loss or injury” means nonpecuniary harm for which damages are recoverable by 
the person suffering the direct or primary loss or injury, including pain and suffering, inconvenience, emotional 
stress, and impairment of the quality of life.  “Noneconomic loss or injury” includes a damage recovery for 
nonpecuniary harm for actions brought under section 13-21-201 or 13-21-202. 
(3) (a) In any civil actions in which damages for noneconomic loss or injury may be awarded, the total 
of such damages shall not exceed the sum of two hundred fifty thousand dollars, unless the court finds 
justification by clear and convincing evidence therefore.  In no case shall the amount of such damages exceed 
five hundred thousand dollars. 
(b) In any civil action, no damages for derivative noneconomic loss or injury may be awarded unless 
the court finds justification by clear and convincing evidence therefore.  In no case shall the amount of such 
damages exceed two hundred fifty thousand dollars. 
13
 Ebenstein, E. P. (2000). Criminal and Civil Parental Liability Statutes: Would they have saved the 15 who died at 
Columbine, at 24-25.  Cardozo Women's Law Journal. 
14
 Janofsky, M. (1999). Columbine Killers, on Tape, Thanked 2 for Gun. The New York Times, at A1. 
15
 Edwards, L. L., Edwards, J. S., & Wells, P. K. (2009). Tort Law for Legal Assistants, 4th ed., at 443. Clifton Park: 
Delmar. 
16
 What happened after Columbine. (2005, March 3). Retrieved May 30, 2011, from usnews.com: 
http://www.usnews.com/usnews/news/articles/050404/4redlake.b.htm. 
6 
neither the Klebold nor the Harris families had assets of $250 million.
17
  Both families are 
middle-class working families with „shallow pockets‟ (few monetary assets). 
Although not precedent in the United States, an incident which occurred on October of 1997 in 
Japan involved a fourteen year old boy and had a similar fact pattern as the tragedy at 
Columbine.  In Japan, the juvenile murderer beheaded Jun Hase, eleven (leaving his head 
impaled on the school gate with a sinister note in his mouth), killed a ten year old girl through 
bludgeoning, and severely injured a nine year old girl by multiple stabbings.  The parents of the 
murderer were ordered to pay nearly $2 million to the families of the victims; $952,000 to the 
family of the beheaded boy, $761,000 to the family of the bludgeoned girl, and $190,000 to the 
family of the stabbed girl.  The juvenile murderer‟s name was withheld under Japanese law due 
to his minor status.  While not binding in any matter to the Columbine case, it is interesting to 
analyze how a country with a much lower crime rate has handled a similar case.
18
 
In cases like Columbine, in other jurisdictions, courts have generally held that mere parenthood 
does not make an individual liable for the acts of a child.
19
  Courts look for the existence of a 
master and servant relationship or at least actions that were done within the scope of the parent‟s 
business.
20
  Parental liability may exist if a court finds that a juvenile committed a tort under the 
parent‟s direction, with the consent of the parent, or if there is a subsequent ratification of the 
                                                 
17
 Ebenstein, E. P., supra note 13, at 25. 
18
 Killer's Parent Agree to Pay Kobe Families. (January 21, 2000). The New York Times, at A12. 
19
 Parents' liability for injury or damage intentionally inflicted by minor children. (2011). In American Law Reports 
3d. (pp. 974-1030, Vol.54). Rochester, New York: The Lawyers Co-Operative Publishing Co.; Supporting case law 
in Florida includes Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1955). 
20
 Id. at 977.  Supporting case law in Florida includes Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1955). 
7 
juveniles‟ action by the parent.
21
  Parents may also be liable in cases where their negligence 
made it possible for the child to cause the injury of another.
22
   Many courts have developed a 
concept that there is a certain „power of control‟ that a parent has over a child, and a failure to 
exercise that power could lead to parental liability.
23
  Furthermore, if it is determined by a court 
that a parent had knowledge of the child‟s vicious or destructive tendencies and he or she failed 
to exercise some reasonable measures to control the child, the parent may also be liable.  To 
protect parents from excessive liability, exceptions have been made in cases where the parent did 
have knowledge of the vicious tendencies of their child but made an attempt to exercise some 
form of control and discipline over the child through reasonable measures.
24
  There seems to be 
no clear cut answer to what constitutes „reasonable measures‟ of control and discipline.  This 
requirement has been broadly defined throughout case law and is subject to different analysis 
based on a case by case scenario. 
Applicable Legal Doctrine and Terms 
To develop a deeper and more thorough understanding of parental liability, the important legal 
doctrine and relevant terminology includes the doctrine of respondeat superior, direct/legal 
liability, and vicarious liability. 
To hold parents liable, courts may refer to the doctrine of respondeat superior (in Latin “let the 
superior make answer”) which holds “an employer or principal liable for the employee‟s or 
                                                 
21
 Id. at 977.  Supporting case law in Florida includes Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1955). 
22
 Id. at 990.  Supporting case law in Florida includes Seabrook v. Taylor, 199 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 4
th
 DCA 1967). 
23
 Id. at 978; Supporting case law in Florida includes Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1955) and Spector v. 
Neer, 262 So.2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). 
24
 Id. at 978; Supporting case law in Florida includes Gissen v. Goodwill, 80 So.2d 701 (Fla. 1955) and Spector v. 
Neer, 262 So.2d 689 (Fla. 3d DCA 1972). 
8 
agent‟s wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or agency.”
25
  This 
doctrine is often applied to other special relationships such as parent-child, if the child is acting 
through the parent‟s instruction or the parent ratifies the actions of the child.  Also applicable to 
this subject matter is direct/legal liability, which is defined as “the quality of state of being 
legally obligated or accountable; legal responsibility to another or to society, enforceable by civil 
remedy or criminal punishment.”
26
  To give an example, one may be directly/legally liable for an 
action or tort if he takes an active part in, contributed to, or authorized the commission of a 
crime.
27
  Lastly, vicarious liability is defined as “liability that a supervisory party (such as an 
employer) bears for the actionable conduct of a subordinate or associate (such as an employee) 
based on the relationship between the two parties.”
28
  A party may be „vicariously liable‟ for an 
action if there is a delegation of authority to another and the person, who the party delegate‟s his 
authority to, commits a tort.
29
  Vicarious liability is often found when the defendant holds a 
special relationship with the tortfeasor.  Such a „special relationship‟ may include, but is not 
limited to, a parent-child and employer-employee relationship.
30
 
It is important to carefully analyze the difference between direct/legal liability and vicarious 
liability since they may seem to overlap in certain situations.  For example, if a trucking 
company hires an employee with a record of drunk driving and who one day is detected by 
management as having the distinct odor of alcohol.  The employer(s) may be held 
                                                 
25




 Barron's Educational Series, Inc. (2011). Business Definition of Direct Liability. Retrieved April 17, 2011, from 
AllBusiness.com: http://www.allbusiness.com/glossaries/direct-liability/4960088-1.html. 
28
 Garner, B. A., supra note 25. 
29
 Edwards, L. L., Edwards, J. S., & Wells, P. K., supra note 15, at 430-31. 
30
 Id. at 431. 
9 
directly/legally liable for negligence if the employee‟s driving causes injury; this is not vicarious 
liability on the employer(s) behalf because he is liable for his own negligence in hiring that 
employee or allowing the employee to drive after becoming aware that he had been drinking.
31
 
The Parental Conundrum 
A „reasonable measure of discipline‟ is a difficult standard to define and presents a 
conundrum.  The problem parents face while raising children is how much parental discipline is 
required.  The key questions that should be asked immediately after a child misbehaves are “why 
has the child acted in this fashion?  [Followed by] do issues exist within the home that might 
have driven the child to act the way he did?”  Some parents discipline their children by 
implementing non-violent punishments, which at times may be argued as ineffective.  Others 
rely on more direct and forceful methods of physical discipline. 
Respected family expert and author of The Nurturing Program, Dr. Stephen Bavolek stated: 
[C]ontemporary social scientists agree that the continued maltreatment of children today 
is primarily the result of poorly trained adults who, in their roles as parents and 
caretakers, attempt to instill discipline and educate children within the context of the 
violence they themselves experienced as children.
32
 
Many have come to understand this as a „cycle of violence‟ that continues from generation to 
generation when there is abuse and neglect within a family unit.
33
  Many children who have been 
exposed to these abusive lifestyles are likely to continue implementing such methods into 
adulthood. 
                                                 
31
 Garner, B. A., supra note 25. 
32
 Bavolek, S. J. (2000). The Nurturing Parenting Programs, at 1. Juvenile Justice Bulletin. 
33
 Id. at 1. 
10 
Analyzing the Problem 
This leads us to the question… Will there ever be a solution as to how we should handle juvenile 
delinquency and who, if anyone, should be held accountable?  In asking these questions we may 
find a possible answer to the first question by focusing on the second question addressing 
accountability.  The focus of juvenile courts is to „rehabilitate‟ the delinquents, but what does 
this mean?  There are different definitions for exactly what rehabilitation means.  First, there is 
the general layperson understanding of the term: “to restore to a former state (as of good repair 
or solvency); to restore (as a convicted criminal defendant) to a useful and constructive place in 
society through therapy, job training, and other counseling.”
34
  Then there is the legal definition: 
“the process of seeking to improve a criminal‟s character and outlook so that he or she can 
function in society without committing other crimes.  It is a traditional theory of criminal 
punishment, along with deterrence and retribution.”
35
 
What can be inferred from these interpretations?  As we break down the different definitions of 
rehabilitation we notice that the layperson‟s definition includes the keyword „restore‟.  A 
layperson may come to the conclusion, using the common definition, that juvenile courts treat 
delinquents as „broken‟ children.  If so, they may question, who is responsible for these „broken‟ 
children?  In examining the legal definition the context is slightly different, in that it mentions a 
„process of improving a criminal‟s behavior‟ instead of „restoring to a former state.‟ 
                                                 
34
 Rehabilitate. (2011). Retrieved February 21, 2011, from Dictionary.com: 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/rehabilitate. 
35
 Garner, B. A., supra note 25. 
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This problem has no clear cut answer to the question of cause and effect.  Therefore, the only 
way that an answer may be found is to find some common elements in juvenile cases.  One can 
soon realize that one common element in every case, which interacts between the child and 
society, is the parent.  This is a reasonable inference because, in many cases, parents tend to 
convey their own understanding and beliefs about society to their children. 
If parents are to be held responsible for the actions of their children, another problem often 
arises.  Under the Eleventh Amendment of the United States Constitution, “[No State shall]… 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”
36
  It is important to 
understand that the Juvenile Courts are focused on the child, not the parent.  In cases where 
juvenile courts order restitution against the parents, there is often a failure to notify them of the 
pending charges and provide them with an opportunity to defend themselves against the 
allegations.  A due process issue exists because, in a juvenile court proceeding there is no 
separate case implemented against the parent.  The decision to hold the parents liable is part of 
an order for joint restitution or community service obligation in the child‟s case, not the parents.  
In Florida there are rules that govern the rights of parents facing restitution or community service 
orders in their child‟s court case.  Section 8.030 (b) of the Florida Rules of Juvenile Procedure 
states that “In any delinquency proceeding in which the state is seeking payment of restitution or 
the performance of community service work by the child‟s parents or legal guardians, a separate 
petition alleging the parents‟… responsibility shall be filed and served on the parent or legal 
guardians of the child.”
37
  This petition does not create a new case in itself, but includes the 
                                                 
36
 U.S. Const. Amend. XIV, §1. 
37
 Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.030 (b). 
12 
parents in the child‟s proceeding.  The petition is entitled “Petition for Parental Sanctions” and it 
shall alleged all relevant facts and show “…the appropriateness of the requested sanction against 
the child‟s parents or legal guardians.”
38
  It also has to be signed by the state attorney or assistant 
state attorney under oath.
39
  This rule was established to insure due process when parents are 
ordered to pay restitution and/or perform community service in their child‟s case. 
By definition, the most basic rights of due process require that all parties involved in a court 
proceeding be given notice and an opportunity to be heard.
 40
  When parents face liability 
lawsuits in a civil courts (typically in a county or circuit court depending on the amount of 
damages) due process issues are not as prevalent if the parents are named as parties to the suit 
and served notice of the proceedings against them.   
                                                 
38
 Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.031 (a). 
39
 Fla. R. Juv. P. 8.031 (b). 
40
 Garner, B. A., supra note 25. 
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CHAPTER II: HISTORY OF JUVENILE COURTS 
It may be inferred that parents, as imperfect beings, have made mistakes in properly instilling 
values and ethics into their children.  Just as parents experience difficulty with children, juvenile 
courts have struggled with how to deal with these young offenders.  Beginning in the 18
th
 
century, juveniles as young as seven could stand trial in criminal court, and if found guilty, could 
be sentenced to prison or even death.
41
  As such, a 14 year old stealing a valuable was as 
unacceptable, in the eyes of society, as a 40 year old man doing the same thing.  During colonial 
times in the United States, courts treated children in a very basic fashion.  Under common law 
principles, state legislatures supplanted the common-law defense of “infancy” with a statutory 
scheme specifying exactly when a juvenile was capable of committing a crime under which he or 
she should have been treated as an adult.  Traditionally any child under the age of seven was 
presumed to be incapable of forming „criminal intent‟, which meant that any child younger than 
seven who violated the law was exempt from prosecution and punishment.
 42
  In Florida, children 
between the ages of seven and fourteen were treated under a “progressively decreasing rebuttable 
presumption of incapacity to commit a crime,” see Morris v. State,
43
 until approximately the late 
1970s and early 1980s.  Morris decided that the legislature supplanted the aforementioned 
presumption “by enacting Chapter 39, Florida Statutes (1979)… with a comprehensive statutory 
                                                 
41
 Snyder, H. N., & Sickmund, M. (2006). Juvenile Offenders and Victims: 2006 National Report, at 94. 
Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and 
Delinquency Prevention. 
42
 Id. at 94. 
43
 Morris v. State, 456 So.2d 925, 926 (Fla. 4
th
 DCA 1984). 
14 
scheme for determining when a juvenile may be deemed capable of committing an offense for 
purposes of being treated as an adult.”
44
 
As the United States progressed into the 19
th
 century it established separate juvenile courts.  This 
movement changed the perception of children from one of miniature adults to one of persons 
with less than fully developed moral and cognitive capacities.
45
  Illinois passed the Juvenile 
Court Act of 1899, which established the first U.S. juvenile court in Cook County, Illinois.
46
  
The primary rationale behind the juvenile court at the time of its creation was the British doctrine 
of parens patriae (the state as parent) establishing the right of the state to intervene in the lives of 
children in a manner different from the way it intervenes in the lives of adults.
47
  This doctrine 
stated that, because children did not have full legal capacity, the state had the inherent power and 
responsibility to provide protection for the children whose parents were not providing 
appropriate care or supervision.
48
  The key element was the focus on the welfare of the child.  
This reach into the lives of children by the state was seen as a court‟s benevolent intervention.
49
 
It took the courts in the United States nearly two centuries to realize that under common law 
there was a problem in how they treated juvenile offenders and, by 1945, juvenile court 
legislation was enacted in all fifty states.
50
  Since then, Juvenile Courts have attempted to 
become more focused on „rehabilitating‟ juvenile offenders, rather than punishing them.  It is 
also important to note that the standard of evidence to find a juvenile guilty of an offense is 
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beyond a reasonable doubt.
51
  Although U.S. courts have attempted to make the transition to 
rehabilitative methods of discipline, the past three decades have shown a growing regression 
toward punitive methods.  Juvenile courts seem to have become more willing to transfer 
jurisdiction of juveniles who commit serious crimes to the adult courts.  This regression is partly 
demonstrated by the increasing number of juveniles tried as adults.  In recent years many states 
have modified statutes in order to expand the options available to try juveniles as adults, which 
have resulted in a nationwide increase in the number of juveniles transferred to adult courts.
52
  
Florida expanded its ability to try juveniles as adults through the following four mechanisms: (1) 
voluntary waiver; (2) involuntary waiver; (3) grand jury indictment; and (4) direct file.
53
  In 2003 
the State Attorney published the following statement when addressing this growing trend: 
“It should be done more often and earlier.”
54
 
When addressing the same issue, the Office of the Public Defender‟s state the following: 
“It is throwing them away.  It is the state, through the court, disavowing any intent, or 
desire, to rehabilitate a child, or young person.”
55
 
In Florida, a possible explanation for the increase in the juvenile transfer rate during the 1980s 
may have been caused by the change of administration in the department of Health and 
Rehabilitative Services (HRS).  HRS later split into the Department of Children and Families and 
the Department of Juvenile Justice in the 1990s.  Following this change in administration many 
                                                 
51
 In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 90 S.Ct. 1068 (1970). 
52
 Office of the State Courts Administrator. (2003). Florida's Juvenile Delinquency Court Assessment, at 39-40. 
Tallahassee. 
53
 Id. at 40. 
54
 Id. at 39. 
55
 Id. at 39.  
16 
state schools, which housed hundreds of juveniles that were part of commitment programs, were 
closed.  This allowed many violent juveniles to be released back into the community.  Once these 
misbehaving juveniles were reintroduced into the court system for their continuing misbehavior 
the courts were left with few options outside of adult system transfers.  The state simply did not 
have enough housing available for all the delinquents.  A reason for shutting down some of 
Florida‟s state schools during the 1980s was the overcrowding and poor living conditions which 
juveniles were allegedly exposed to.  There were multiple lawsuits filed by various children‟s 
rights groups, one of which was Bobby v Chiles, et al.
56
  While some state schools were subject 
to consent decrees that required them to improve their living conditions, as was the case in 
Bobby, others were simply shut down. 
Once a juvenile is transferred and sentenced in adult court, regardless of what type of transfer 
occurs, they will be prosecuted in adult court for all subsequent offenses.  This concept is known 
as “Once an Adult/Always an Adult,” which, as of 2003, thirty other states also exercised.
57
  If a 
juvenile is found guilty in adult court, depending on the offense(s) and the particular method of 
transfer, the court may either sentence the juvenile as an adult or may impose juvenile sanctions, 
but not both in Florida.
58
 
The theoretical focus of juvenile court has always been on the actual offenders themselves and 
not the offense(s), and on rehabilitation and not punishment.
59
  One part of the concept of how 
the juvenile system differs from the adult system has been to change, among other things, the 
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word „sentencing‟ to „disposition.‟  Florida‟s juvenile court dispositions were created to be more 
remedial in contrast to adult sentencing, which focuses on punishment.
60
  Although during the 
last three decades there is evidence of a regressive movement away from the theoretical 
rehabilitative procedures of the juvenile justice system to more punitive measures, the number of 
juveniles transferred to adult courts in Florida has been steadily declining since 1995.
61
  Figure 
three (3) in Appendix B reflects data collected by the U.S. Department of Justice regarding 
delinquency case transfer rates to adult jurisdictions from 1985-2002.  Notice the steady increase 
from 1985-1995, followed by a decline which occurred after the peak year (1995-2002):
62
 
The Department of Juvenile Justice suggests that a possible reason for the decline in the transfer 
rate after 1995 is that the “enhancements in deep-end capacity and treatment effectiveness have 
not escaped the attention of prosecutors responsible for direct filings.  High-risk and maximum-
risk juvenile correctional facilities have become a viable alternative to adult criminal 
sanctions.”
63
  The movement toward rehabilitative measures is the reflection of a „progressive 
evolution‟ from the common law, although juveniles were able to assert the defense of incapacity 
by reason of infancy.
64
  Even though this new form of „juvenile justice‟ is a better fit for our 
ever-changing society than its predecessor under common law, it is still far from perfect.  In a 
2011 interview with Judge Daniel P. Dawson, an Osceola County Unified Family Court Judge 
for the Ninth Judicial Circuit Court who has twenty years of judicial experience and a prior 
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eleven years of experience with the assistant state attorney office specializing in juvenile justice, 
there was discussion as to the effectiveness of the juvenile court system.  Commitment programs 
that are implemented through the juvenile court system are somewhat effective in rehabilitating 
first time offenders, but do not appear to be as effective in addressing the needs of repeat 
offenders or career criminals.  Judge Dawson expressed that schools, family, and other 
environmental factors may contribute more to the rehabilitation of juveniles than six or twelve 
month programs that control or detain the children for only those short periods of time.  Thus, 
there are theories which suggest that, for juveniles who show progress in their rehabilitation, 
more of the court‟s focus should be on involving children in community service/commitment 
programs and less on placing them in state schools. 
Parental Accountability 
Louisiana was one of the first states to enact a statute that made parents answerable to damages 
for the acts of their minor and un-emancipated children.
65
  During the developmental years of 
parental liability, many jurisdictions held parents liable for only a limited (and typically nominal) 
monetary amount.  These caps on recovery were irrespective to the extent of actual damages 
incurred by the victim.  These amounts usually ranged between $250 and $500.  It is reasonable 
to infer from these small penalties that their existence served to punish parents for the 
misbehavior of their children, rather than to compensate the victims.
66
  Over time these limits 
have increased in an attempt to adequately compensate victims.  Unfortunately, even though the 
                                                 
65
 Validity and construction of statutes making parents liable for torst committed by their minor children. (2011). In 
American Law Report 3d (pp. 615, Vol. 8). Rochester, New York: The Lawyers Co-operative Publishing Company; 
Supporting case law includes Marionneaux v. Brugier, 35 La.Ann. 13 (1883). 
66
 Validity and construction of statutes making parents liable for torst committed by their minor children, Id. at 615. 
19 
system has been tweaked by legislatures, there are cases where severely injured individuals 
cannot recover adequate damages. 
Some states have codified parental liability.  Since statutes imposing strict liability on parents for 
the acts of their children is in derogation of common law, these statutes must be strictly 
construed.  There is authority outside of Florida which supports the concept that public policy 
throughout the United States may reinforce the understanding that parents are not liable unless a 
child acted willfully, wantonly, or through some sort of gross negligence.
67
  Some states limit 
recovery further by focusing only on situations where the child acted with malicious intent.
68
  
Malice can be defined as “[I]ntent, without justification or excuse, to commit a wrongful act… 
[Or acting with a] reckless disregard of the law or of a person's legal rights.”
69
  Where liability 
statutes exist and recovery is available, there exists case law outside of Florida that has 
determined that liability may be imposed against the parents regardless of their knowledge of the 
child‟s action(s) or of any neglect of the parental authority.
70
  At the same time, some courts 
have denied recovery against the parents where a minor is deemed of such “tender years” that the 
concept of negligence would seem unfit.
71
  The “tender years” concept has been subject to 
criticism, as some courts have decided that parents of even a very young child may be 
vicariously liable for the damages suffered by a victim(s) due to the child‟s actions.
72
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Status Offenders 
Children who start out as status offenders may become delinquents in the future.  Actions taken 
early by the parents working with these children may affect future liability.  Not all wrongful 
actions constitute the label „Juvenile Delinquent‟.  The status offender title is for children that are 
considered out of their parent‟s control.
73
  A status offense is a term that comes from the concept 
that if not for the status of the individual, the commission of the act would not constitute an 
unlawful violation of any state ordinance or statute.
74
  Smoking, alcohol possession, curfew, and 
gun possession are some of the violations that can label a child as a status offender.
75
  These 
status violations do not apply to adults since adults may smoke, consume alcohol, are not subject 
to curfews, and may possess a gun under certain conditions that vary from state to state.  The 
distinguishing factor between a status offender and a delinquent is that the status offender has not 
committed an act that would be a crime if committed by an adult; a delinquent youth has 
committed such an act or violation of the law.
76
  Many states do not consider „status‟ 
misbehavior to be violations against the law, instead they view these behaviors as indicators that 
the child is in need of supervision.  Therefore, they handle status offense matters more like 
dependency cases than delinquency cases, responding to behaviors by providing social 
services.
77
  Florida law for status offenders is located under Chapter 984 of the Florida Statutes 
and, more specifically, under section 984.11 there are services available for families that are in 
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need of such assistance.  These services include, but are not limited to: homemaker or parent aide 
services; intensive crisis counseling; parent training; individual, group or family counseling; 
community mental health services; prevention and diversion services; services provided by 
voluntary or community agencies; runaway center services; housekeeper services; special 
educational, tutorial or remedial services; vocational, job training or employment services; 
recreational services; and assessments.
78
  Under section 981.11 (3), Florida Statutes (2011), 
parents are responsible for contributing to the costs of the child or family services and treatment 
to the extent of their ability to pay.
79
 
In recent years status offenders have received more public attention as society attempts to 
rehabilitate children at a younger age to avoid a progression towards delinquency status.  
Unfortunately, these statutes are not always enforced by the courts due to the large volume of 
“[S]erious and violent juvenile crimes, coupled with the huge volume of child abuse cases 
coming before the courts… [resulting in a] declining interest within the juvenile justice system of 
pursuing status offender proceedings.”
80
  A reason for this declining interest is the frustration felt 
by many judges and police enforcement officials by reform measures that have made it more 
difficult for courts to send status offenders, particularly runaways, to secure placement settings.  
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Status offense statutes have generally given courts authoritative jurisdiction over young 
individuals.  Some jurisdictions label these young offenders as “children in need of services” 
(CHINS) or “persons in need of supervision” (PINS).  Historically courts have viewed these 
assignments in a delinquency prevention approach, since early misbehavior usually predicts 
future involvement in delinquent activity.
82
  This prevention strategy is generally unsuccessful 
since it fails to provide courts with explicit legal authority to order parents to comply with court 
orders involving the parents‟ behavior that may affect their children.  Thus, many state 
legislatures have turned these traditional „child-as-wrongdoer‟ concepts into a “Families in Need 
of Services” (FINS) or similar type of family unit related judicial action.  In Florida the FINS 
statute is designed to emphasize parental responsibility, with the court advising parents that they 
are responsible for contributing to the costs of services provided by the government, such as 
family mediation, and the court may require the families to pay certain fines and fees related to 
the services.
83
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CHAPTER III: FLORIDA STATUTES 
Since delinquency cases alone have often failed in the rehabilitation of children, several states 
have implemented “Parental Civil Liability” (PCL) statutes to rehabilitee, deter and punish 
juveniles.  These statutes also exist to compensate victims.   Many PCL laws date back to the 
1950‟s or 1960‟s but the first was enacted in 1846 by the Hawaii Legislature and is one of the 
broadest since as it has no limits on financial recovery, stipulates parental liability for both 
negligent and intentional damages caused by minor children, and covers personal injuries as well 
as property loss related expenses.
84
  These types of statutes are necessary because young children 
cannot be sued in their individual capacities because of their inability to form intent, lack of 
competency to stand trial and lack of personal assets.  Also as mentioned earlier, under common 
law a victim‟s recovery against the parents of a delinquent was barred, unless parental action or 
inaction could be directly tied to the child‟s act (establishing direct/vicarious liability).
85
 
In Florida the legislative intent for Chapter 985 of the Florida Statutes which deals with juvenile 
justice includes “[The] protection of society, by providing for a comprehensive standardized 
assessment of the child‟s needs so that the most appropriate control, discipline, punishment, and 
treatment can be administered consistent with the seriousness of the act committed, the 
community‟s long-term need for public safety, [etc.]... while also providing [whenever possible] 
restitution to the victim of the offense.”
86
  In line with this last objective, legislatures have 
established that parents may be vicariously liable for the torts of their children.  A court that has 
jurisdiction over an adjudicated delinquent may “Order the child‟s parent or guardian, together 
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with the child, to render community service…” if the court finds that “[T]he parent or guardian 
did not make a diligent and good faith effort to prevent the child from engaging in delinquent 
acts.”
87
  This rationale follows the current public policy that parents have a responsibility to 
convey accepted values and morals to their children, along with the interests of the community.  
Section 985.513, Florida Statutes (2011) establishes that the court may “Order the parent or 
guardian to make restitution… for any damage or loss caused by the child‟s offense… [and may] 
require the child‟s parent or legal guardian to be responsible for any restitution ordered against 
the child.”
88
  The court also has the ability to “[R]etain jurisdiction over the child and the child‟s 
parent or legal guardian whom the court has ordered to pay restitution until the restitution order 
is satisfied or the court orders otherwise.”
89
  An earlier version of this statute, under section 
39.11 of the Florida Statutes (1987), limited restitution orders against parents to $2,500.  This 
limit on restitution was removed in 1987 and the section was repealed in 1990.  Currently, the 
amount of restitution that can be ordered against a parent must be of “[A] reasonable amount… 
to be determined by the court.  When restitution is ordered… the amount of restitution may not 




Following current public policy which advocates parental accountability, civil courts may also 
hold parents liable for the “[W]illful destruction or theft of property by [their] minor [child].”
91
  
Under section 741.24 (1), Florida Statutes (2011) “Any municipal corporation, county, school 
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district or department of Florida; any person, partnership, corporation, or association; or any 
religious organization, whether incorporated or unincorporated, shall be entitled to recover 
damages… from the parents of any minor… living with the parents, who maliciously or willfully 
destroys or steals property… belonging to such [person or entity].”
92
  Recovery under this 
section is “[L]imited to the actual damages in addition to taxable court costs.”
93
 
Lastly, section 768.81, Florida Statutes (2011) permits recovery for torts as a result of negligence 
under the comparative fault doctrine.  It defines a negligence lawsuit as “[A] civil action for 
damages based upon a theory of negligence, strict liability, [etc.]… The substance of an action, 
not conclusory terms used by a party, determines whether an action is a negligence action.”
94
  
Lawsuits based on this statute can be used as a method of recovery against parents, by victims of 
delinquency, for their vicarious liability. 
Florida statutes help clarify how far parental liability may extend in regard to the public policy 
which western society has developed over the past century.  Parent(s) may be held strictly liable 
for the actions of their children if, among other exceptions, they encourage the commission of 
tortious conduct or accept benefits from such acts.  To explain further, the encouragement of a 
tortious acts does not have to be based on actual instructions given to a child to commit an act, 
but may be caused by the parent‟s lack of response to the known continual harmful habits of the 
child.  Similarly, a parent who negligently entrusts a dangerous object to a child or who fails to 
protect others from the dangerous tendencies of the child will also be held vicariously liable.
95
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Clearly, it would be improper to find that parents are always at fault, but current public policy is 
in the opinion that parents have a responsibility to their community to monitor and control their 
children.  If a child is clearly defiant and consistently demonstrates that they will not behave in a 
certain civilized and law abiding fashion, it is left to the parent to take the necessary action(s) in 
an effort to control and change the child‟s misbehavior.  Public policy seems to be in the opinion, 
whether through court intervention or private counseling, parents must do everything reasonable 
and within their power to rehabilitate their children.  
27 
CHAPTER IV: FLORIDA CASE LAW 
Landmark Case Advocating Civil Liability 
Under common law parents could not be held accountable for the actions of their children, but in 
1955 the Supreme Court of Florida created some exceptions to the common law concept of non-
accountability when it decided Gissen v. Goodwill.
96
 
As stated above, for nearly two centuries parents in Florida enjoyed the safe haven of non-
accountability for the actions of children.  Gissen involved Geraldine Goodwill, the minor child 
of Albert and Mrs. Albert Goodwill, and Julius Gissen, appellant.  Mr. Gissen was employed as a 
clerk at the Gaylord Hotel in the City of Miami Beach, Florida.  Appellees were residing as 
business invitees at the Gaylord Hotel.  The complaint filed in this case alleged that during the 
Goodwill‟s stay at the Gaylord Hotel, Geraldine, 8 years old at the time of the incident, “did 
willfully, deliberately, intentionally and maliciously [swing a door] with such great force and 
violence against the plaintiff so that the middle finger on plaintiff‟s left had was caught in the 
door and a portion of the said finger was caused to be instantaneously severed and fell to the 
floor.”
97
  The complaint further alleged that Mr. and Mrs. Goodwill were responsible for their 
child‟s act due to a lack of “paternal discipline and neglect in the exercise of needful paternal 
influence and authority… [Mr. and Mrs. Goodwill negligently failed] to restrain the child, 
Geraldine Goodwill, whom they knew to have dangerous tendencies and propensities of a 
mischievous and wanton disposition; said parents had full knowledge of previous particular acts 
committed by their daughter about the hotel premises… and that the defendant Geraldine 
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Goodwill did commit other wanton, willful and intentional acts of a similar nature to the act 
committed against the plaintiff…”  Mr. and Mrs. Goodwill “…nevertheless, continually failed to 
exercise any restraint whatsoever over the child‟s reckless and mischievous conduct, thereby 




On appeal the court affirmed the previous trial court decision rendering judgment against 
appellant because the court determined that Mr. Gissen failed to state a cause of actionable 
negligence against Mr. and Mrs. Goodwill.  The court went on to establish that there are 
exceptions where liability on parents does exist, but they are limited to the following: “1. [The 
parent] intrusts his [or her] child with an instrumentality which, because of the lack of age, 
judgment, or experience of the child, may become a source of danger to others. [This exception 
was later applied in Gilbert v. Merritt, where parents were found liable for entrusting a two year 
old child with an electric motorized vehicle.
99
] 2. Where a child, in the commission of a tortuous 
act, is occupying the relationship of a servant or agent of its parents. 3. Where the parent knows 
of his child‟s wrongdoing and consents to it, directs or sanctions it. 4. Where [the parent] fails to 
exercise parental control over his minor child, although he knows or in the exercise of due care 
should have known that injury to another is a probable consequence.”
100
  Although there was no 
liability here, in dicta the court recognized the already established legal concept that a parent is 
not liable for the torts of his or her minor child because “of the mere fact of his paternity.”
101
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The court reasoned that in order to hold parents vicariously liable for the tortuous acts of their 
children (in reference to negligence) the parents must have failed to exercise parental restraint in 
other former instances involving acts similar in nature to the act which the lawsuit is based upon.  
If the parent had no prior knowledge of the child‟s ability, propensity or habit of committing 
similar acts, the parent is not liable. 
When Should a Jury Decide or Court Intervene In Civil Matters 
Pertaining to the issue of when parental negligence is an issue that a jury should decide upon, in 
the 1967 case Seabrook v. Taylor, the Fourth District Court of Appeals in Florida decided that 
when evidence of negligence exists, the ultimate decision as to whether parents are civilly liable 
should be left in the hands of the finder of fact which in many civil cases is a jury and not a 
judge.
102
  The court did this by affirming a lower court‟s decision denying the defendant parents‟ 
motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, or, in the alternative, new trial, because it 
found that the evidence presented during trial was sufficient to allow the issue of the defendant 
parents‟ neglect to be presented to the jury.  This case involved defendants John and Girlean 
Seabrook, parents of minor child Seefus Seabrook (who was 14 years old at the time of the 
incident), and plaintiff father Willie Taylor and his children Robert and Van C. Taylor, 15 and 12 
respectively.  A civil suit was brought to recover for damages for personal injuries due to pistol 
wounds inflicted upon the minor Taylors by the defendant‟s minor child, Seefus Seabrook, and 
the consequential damages suffered by Willie Taylor.  The incident occurred after a basketball 
game that ended with a dispute between the Taylors and Seefus due to alleged fouling and „rough 
play‟ by the Taylors.  After the game Seefus went home, taking the basketball (which he owned) 
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with him.  The Taylors followed.  There was evidence presented that Seefus went into the house 
and came out with a pistol which he displayed to Robert Taylor.  At first Seefus was persuaded 
by another boy, who was present but not involved in the dispute, to put the gun back into the 
house.  After putting the pistol back in the house, Seefus returned outside and the dispute 
continued.  Shortly thereafter, Seefus reentered in to the house, grab the pistol again and returned 
outside.  He then began shooting at the Taylors.  Twice he pulled the trigger, but received only a 
misfire.  Upon subsequent efforts, he fired several more times inflicting a slight wound on 
Robert and striking Van in the stomach, which was a more serious injury. 
The defendants did not appeal the portion of the original judgment against Seefus Seabrook, 
since there was ample evidence to sustain a finding of liability on his part due to his negligence 
and intentional misconduct.  The question put before the appellate court was whether or not the 
evidence supported a finding of liability on the parents of Seefus for the injuries resulting from 
their son‟s actions. 
Relying on the dicta from Gissen, which in part acknowledged the common law principle that a 
parent is not liable for the tort of his minor child because of the mere fact of his paternity, the 
Seebrook appellate court examined the exceptions that can create liability.  More specifically, the 
court looked at the exceptions where a parent may be liable if he “(1)… intrusts his child with an 
instrumentality which, because of the lack of age, judgment, or experience of the child, may 
become a source of danger to others; (2) where a child, in the commission of a tortious act, is 
occupying the relationship of a servant or agent of its parents; (3) where the parent knows of his 
child‟s wrongdoing and consents to it, directs or sanctions it; [and lastly] (4) where [the parent] 
31 
fails to exercise parental control over his minor child, although he knows or in the exercise of 
due care should have known that injury to another is a probably consequence.”
103
  The Seebrook 
court rationalized that if they were to rely only on the exceptions of liability created by the 
Gissen court, it would have to reverse the judgment against the parents of Seefus since there was 
not sufficient evidence presented to the jury from which any of these particular instances of 
liability would fall.  However, the district court also determined that “[T]he Gissen case does not 
hold specifically that those exceptions enumerated therein are exclusive.  In all cases the 
question of liability is to be determined on the broad basis of whether or not the parent has been 
guilty of negligence, that is, a failure to exercise due care in the circumstances.”
104
  In this case, 
the court upheld the trial courts‟ decision which allowed the case to be submitted to the jury on 
the basis of negligence from the defendant‟s failure to secure the pistol in a safe location within 
the house (the loaded pistol was left inside an unlocked closet in a room which was accessible to 
Seefus at all times and whose location was known by Seefus).  The court also took notice of 
dicta in Gissen where the Supreme Court cited Ellis v. D’Angelo, an appellate decision in 
California, and stated “[T]hat a parent may become liable for an injury caused by the child, 
where the parent‟s negligence made it possible for the child to cause the injury complained of, 




The common law concept that parents or guardians are not liable simply because of the mere fact 
of parenthood is still the general rule in any case in Florida unless a plaintiff alleges that 
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defendants were culpable of some “actionable negligence” as directed by law under Gissen or 
Seabrook.  A case that exemplified the crucial aspect of stating actionable negligence is Spector 
v. Neer, where the Third District Court of Appeals heard a matter alleging parental liability for 
property damage caused by a minor.
 106
  Plaintiffs Julius Spector, Louis Spector and Elmore 
Spector, d/b/a Spector & Sons, (owners of the lot and dwelling house damaged in this case) sued 
defendants, Harold and Rita Neer, along with their insurance company Lititz Mutual Insurance 
Company.  They alleged negligence against the Neers for allowing their child to be entrusted 
with matches, which resulted in damage by fire to the dwelling of said parents.  The defendants 
in this matter filed a motion to dismiss the plaintiffs‟ amended complaint with leave to amend.  
Plaintiffs did not file a second amended complaint and stood on their original amended 
complaint.  An order dismissing the case against the plaintiffs was entered. 
In Spector the exceptions created in Gissen rendering parents liable, if certain conditions are 
found to exist, were not “sufficiently stated” as a cause for action.  There was no allegation in the 
complaint that Hurley Neer, the minor child, had a habit of doing the particular type of wrongful 
act which resulted in the injuries, nor did the complaint state that Hurley ever set fire to anything 
before.  There was no connection between the alleged failure of parental control and the resultant 
injuries made in the complaint.  To further explain the complaint did not charge actionable 
negligence on the part of the defendant parents.  In this case the court did not render a decision 
since the failure of the amended complaint to state a cause of action under the Gissen exceptions 
rendered the point moot. 
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A related case that further discusses what constitutes actionable negligence under Gissen is Snow 
v. Nelson.
107
  In Snow the Florida Supreme Court heard a case which involved reviewing a 
decision made by the Third District Court of Appeals which had affirmed a trial court‟s order 
directing a verdict in favor of defendant parents.  The trial court found that the defendants were 
not liable for a tortious injury their child inflicted onto the plaintiff‟s child. 
The Snow lawsuit was based on an incident that occurred when defendant‟s child seriously 
injured plaintiff‟s child while involved in play.  Plaintiffs filed suit claiming vicarious liability 
and direct negligence against defendant parents, due to their alleged knowledge of the tortfeasor 
child‟s propensity to be rough with smaller children.  During the trial phase the defendant parents 
motioned for a directed verdict.  The court reserved its ruling on this motion until the closing of 
the evidence and the jury‟s retirement.  After the jury retired, the court granted the defendant‟s 
motion for a directed verdict.  It is interesting to note that the jury did return with a verdict 
finding the defendant parents comparatively seventy-five percent at fault, with total damages 
estimated to approximately $135,000.  Unfortunately for the plaintiffs, the jury‟s verdict was not 
applied because of the court‟s directed verdict in favor of the defendants. 
The Supreme Court noted the basic legal principle that parents are not liable due to the mere fact 
of paternity.  They re-stated the established exceptions mentioned in Gissen and reasoned that 
this case concerned exception four, that the parents may be liable if they “[Fail] to exercise 
control over the minor child although the parent knows or with due care should know that injury 
to another is possible.”
108
  The Supreme Court decided that in this case, like Gissen, the plaintiffs 
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failed to allege that the defendant child had previously engaged in the particular act which 
caused the injury to plaintiffs‟ child.  Appellants (plaintiffs) urged that this narrow application of 
exception four not be followed, since it creates an injustice.  After deliberations the Supreme 
Court disagreed with appellants and decided that it would not recede from Gissen. 
In his concurring opinion, Justice Raymond Ehrlich (with Justice Shaw concurring) disagreed 
“[W]ith Gissen‟s excessively narrow construction of the fourth exception: the parent‟s failure to 
exercise control over a minor child where the parent has actual or constructive knowledge of the 
child‟s propensity for causing injury.”
109
  Justice Ehrlich stated that he “[W]ould hope that, 
where Gissen before us today, we would construe that exception to the general rule of parental 
non-liability to encompass Gissen‟s facts.  Where parents have actual or constructive notice of 
their offspring‟s propensity to commit a general class of malicious acts, the child‟s creativity in 
developing new ways to bring about injury should not absolve parents from the duty to attend to 
and discipline the child.  Breach of that duty should give rise to liability.”
110
  Justice Ehrlich 
agreed with the majority that the facts in Snow do differ from those in Gissen because, in Snow, 
the children were playing together at the time of the injury.  He noted that the basic nature of 
play involves the possibility of injury and concluded that “[W]e cannot read Gissen so broadly to 
require parents to deny children normal-albeit rough and potentially dangerous-play.”
111
 
Florida Parental Liability Statute Constitutionality 
Florida‟s parental liability statutes have been subject to scrutiny on multiple occasions, one such 
instance occurred in the 1981 Stang v. Waller case where the 4
th
 DCA was asked to determine 
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the constitutionality of section 741.24, Florida Statutes (1981).
112
  A trial court in Florida had 
previously ruled this statute, imposing strict vicarious liability on parents when their minor 
children maliciously or willfully destroyed or stolen property valued up to $2,500.00, was 
unconstitutional.  In this case the trial court was persuaded by arguments relying on Georgia 
opinions that the statute was unreasonable, arbitrary, and capricious.
113
 
Interestingly, shortly after the trial decision in Stang, the Supreme Court of Georgia reconsidered 
its rational in Corley and found a similar statute in Georgia constitutional in Hayward v. Ramick: 
Corley… stands alone among a number of opinions dealing with the 
constitutionality of parental responsibility statutes in various jurisdictions. The 
other statutes have uniformly been upheld. See, Vanthournout v. Burge, 69 
Ill.App.3d 193, 25 Ill.Dec.685, 387 N.E.2d 341 (1979) and cases cited therein. 
Some courts have accepted the distinction this court found in our previous statute, 
Rudnay v. Corbett, 53 Ohio App.2d 311, 374 N.E.2d 171, and others have not. In 
re Sorrell, 20 Md.App. 179, 315 A.2d 110, 115 (1974). While we do not reaffirm 
Corley, we do hold that the legislature has met the objections to Corley in the new 
statute with which we now deal.  [1] Setting aside the history of our statute and 
prior decisions for the moment, we will undertake to analyze Code Ann. 105-113 
under the recognized due process approach.  Substantive due process requires that 
the statute not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means have a 
real and substantial relation to the object sought to be obtained. Nebbia v. New 
York, 291 U.S. 502, 525, 54 S. Ct. 505, 510-511, 78 L. Ed. 940 (1933). The law 
must rationally relate to a legitimate end of government. Nowak, et al., 
Constitutional Law, p. 410 (1978). No basis has been put forward for any higher 
scrutiny and we find none. We hold that this statute, intended to aid in reducing 
juvenile delinquency by imposing liability upon parents who control minors is 
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neither unreasonable arbitrary nor capricious. We further hold that the state has a 
legitimate interest in the subject (controlling juvenile delinquency), and that there 
is a rational relationship between the means used (imposing of liability upon 
parents of children who wilfully or maliciously damage property) and this object. 
Furthermore, the General Assembly has enacted legislation incorporating those 
distinguishing features pointed to in Corley, supra, and thereby overcame any 
objections which Corley found to exist in the former statute. The statute violates 
neither due process nor Corley.
114
 
After considering the aforementioned Georgia case, Stang reversed the trial court‟s decision and 
deemed that this statute did not violate substantive due process because it was not unreasonable, 
arbitrary, nor capricious and its means had a real and substantial relation to the object sought to 
be obtained by the State.  The Stang court reasoned that the legislative intent for these types of 
statutes is to assist in controlling juvenile delinquency.  They considered dicta in Hayward which 
stated that “The state has a legitimate interest in subject [controlling juvenile delinquency], and 
there is a rational relationship between the means used [imposing of liability upon parents of 
children who willfully or maliciously damage property] and this object.”
115
 
A Parent’s “Good Faith Effort” 
Parents or guardians can avoid strict liability for the actions of children if they can demonstrate 
that they took specific actions in good faith in an effort to deter the child‟s misconduct.  This 
burden is further increased if the child is already an adjudicated delinquent.  If the child is, the 
parent or guardian is assumed to already be aware of the dangerous capabilities of the youth and 
will have to prove their efforts were beyond those of the average parent.  The “good faith effort” 
burden of proof was the subject of discussion in the 1990 case M.D. v. State of Florida.
116
  In 
M.D. the Second District Court of Appeals held that parents of children adjudicated delinquents 
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have a responsibility to undertake “…extraordinary efforts, over and above the efforts of average 
parents, in an attempt to prevent [their children‟s] delinquent acts.”
117
  In the aforementioned 
case, appellants, the parents of a delinquent child who stole and destroyed  the victim‟s vehicle 
after he escaped from his home in the middle of the night, appealed an order from the trial court 
requiring them to pay $2,500 as restitution, pursuant to section 39.11(1)(f), Florida Statutes 
(1987).  In an odd sequence of events, just hours before the theft and destruction of the vehicle 
on October 1, 1988, the aforementioned statute was amended to eliminate the $2,500 limit on 
parental liability and is now cited as section 741.24, Florida Statutes (2011).  In this case, 
Appellants argued that the statute as amended was inapplicable because the child was nineteen 
years old on the date of the civil action filing and thus any civil action was be brought after the 
child‟s majority.  The appellate court interpreted section 741.24, Florida Statutes (2011) as 
placing liability upon parents if the conditions of the statute existed at the time of the 
delinquent‟s act.  In M.D., at the time of the vehicle theft the child was under the age of eighteen 
and living at home with his parents, thus under the aforementioned statute the parents were liable 
at the time of the act and would remain liable.  During this decision the appellate court took into 
account the legislature‟s announced policy “…to impose liability upon parents for their child‟s 
willful or malicious acts of theft or destruction” in the attempt to lower the delinquency rate by 
forcing parents to pay closer attention to their children.
 118
  The appellate court agreed with the 
trial courts‟ determination that “[i]n cases which implicate the strict liability of section 741.24… 
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the parents have the burden to prove a degree of effort which is over and above the efforts 
involved in average parenting.”
119
 
To further clarify what efforts are sufficient to eliminate a parent or guardian‟s strict liability 
under a Florida statute, another case to examine is A.S. v. State of Florida.
120
  In this case the 
child was not adjudicated delinquent and as such the parent did not have to prove “extraordinary 
efforts” as stated in M.D.  In A.S. the parents had to simply prove that they made some effort to 
deter the child‟s actions.  The Fourth District Court of Appeal in Florida reviewed A.S. which 
involved appellant A.S., a child, and appellee, the State of Florida. In this case A.S. was 
convicted of aggravated battery and restitution was ordered in the amount of $4,986.60; $2,500 




The incident in this case occurred when A.S. was involved in a schoolyard fight in which the 
victim suffered a broken nose.  The trial court held that there was ample testimony to the affect 
that A.S was the aggressor in the fight, which the appellate court affirmed.  The court did note 
that “[W]hile appellant filed a notice of appeal, his mother did not join in the notice nor seek to 
be added later.  The only issue raised with regard to the restitution order [dealt] with the mother 
being ordered to bear responsibility for $2,500… [the state] made no argument on appeal that the 
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absence of the mother from the appeal papers [created] a question as to the standing of the child 
to argue the precise issue.  [The court] therefore express[ed] no opinion on the issue of 
standing.”
122
  Therefore, the court reasoned that there might have been an issue as to whether the 
child could argue this restitution order on behalf of his mother, but since the state did not raise an 
objection the issue was declared shut. 
Appellant‟s mother testified that her son had an unblemished record outside of this incident, she 
said that his behavior at school and home was exemplary - “the best behaved kid that ever was.”  
She continued stating that he always obeyed her and never argued, had a good school attendance 
record and was even on the honor roll.  A.S. was a 13 year old child of divorced parents whose 
father was located in Connecticut (which he only spoke to by phone) at the time of his 
sentencing.  Along with this, the court also considered the mother‟s series of relationships with 
other men, which caused a lack of family stability in his personal life. 
Concededly the court took note that “the evidence [was] one-sided.  Hence, the issue might 
properly be viewed as whether the court could make the mother liable simply by not believing 
her testimony.”
123
  The court found in particular that the State did not argue this point, but 
instead “[contended] that the mother could have anticipated the boy‟s delinquent acts and that 
she „had the burden to establish a degree of effort above and beyond the normal parenting tasks 
to establish her diligence by the greater weight of the evidence.‟”
124
  The court went on to decide 
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that the States position was “clearly [not] what section 39.054(a)(f) requires.  All she need have 
shown is „diligent good faith efforts to prevent the child from engaging in delinquent acts.‟”
125
 
Considering all the facts and evidence the appellate court was presented, it held that “…the child 
is otherwise well-behaved, then surely it should be enough for the parent to show merely that she 
had accomplished the „normal parenting tasks‟ to escape liability for restitution under this 
statute.  To do otherwise would be to impose strict liability on parents for all delinquent acts of 
their minor children.  If the legislature had intended that result, it would have chose a different 
text than the one it had adopted at the time.”
126
  In regard to this interpretation of the said statute 
and furthering considering the state‟s particular argument in support of the order on appeal, the 
court reversed the part of the order requiring the mother of A.S. to be responsible for part of the 
restitution award.  All other respects of the order were affirmed.  In examining the parent‟s 
“good faith effort,” opinions may exist that the burden of proof is rather lenient on parents of 
regular children and heavy on parents of adjudicated delinquents, where the efforts they must 
make are burdensome and can be very difficult to prove. 
Due Process Issues Regarding Restitution 
There are constitutional rights that parents and guardians have which must addressed if the State 
is looking to impose restitution against them.  One of these rights is the parent‟s due process 
requirement.  If one is to be ordered to pay restitution, he or she must be notified of the 
allegations against them and have an opportunity to be heard in their defense.  Keeping in mind 
the “good faith effort” defense as mentioned in M.D., the 2003 Fisher v. State of Florida case 
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discussed the importance the State‟s need to abide by the due process doctrine.
127
  In Fisher the 
court decided that Appellant, Ms. Fisher (the mother of juvenile delinquent T.F.), was 
wrongfully ordered to pay restitution in the amount of $25,861 for T.F.‟s burglary and arson 
convictions.  Ms. Fisher was ordered by a juvenile court to satisfy her restitution requirement by 
monthly installments of $250.  Ms. Fisher was ordered to pay this restitution based on section 
985.231 (9), Florida Statutes (2003) which stated in part that “[A court could] order the parent or 
guardian of the child to perform community service if the court finds that the parent or guardian 
did not make a diligent and good faith effort to prevent the child from engaging in delinquent 
acts.  The court may also order the parent or guardian to make restitution in money or in kind for 
any damage or loss caused by the child‟s offense.”
128
  Fisher decided that the juvenile court 
made two fatal errors in this case.  The first being that the court never held a hearing to 
determine if Ms. Fisher had made any diligent or good faith effort to prevent T.F. from engaging 
in the delinquent acts.  The second error was the lack of notice provided to Ms. Fisher that she 
would be liable for restitution.  Ms. Fisher never attended any of her daughter‟s juvenile 
proceedings.  The Fisher court held that there were no pleadings or allegations which could have 
put her on notice that the state would seek restitution against her personally.  This lack of notice 
left Ms. Fisher ignorant of the allegations and consequences she faced and was deemed to have 
violated her due process rights.  Due to the circumstances of this case, the court in Fisher held 
that the contempt order against Ms. Fisher (for failing to pay the monthly restitution penalty and 
the actual restitution amount in its entirety) was unconstitutional because it violated her due 
process right.  The court decided that, since Ms. Fisher was not given an opportunity to defend 
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herself and prove her “good faith effort” to deter her child‟s conduct, the State was not ultimately 
entitled to the assumption that Ms. Fisher could not have otherwise proven such efforts.  Also, a 
“good diligence and good faith hearing” should have taken place to protect Ms. Fisher from 
unjust liability in case she could have proven that her efforts to deter and/or remedy the actions 
of the child were legally sufficient to escape liability.
129
  These fatal errors led the Fisher court to 
their decision to remove the contempt order against Ms. Fisher, for her failure to pay restitution, 
and reverse the restitution order in its entirety.  The decision was made without prejudice, 
leaving the door open for the State to file new charges against Ms. Fisher if it wanted to seek 
restitution. 
Other Exceptions to a Parent or Guardian’s Liability and Past 
Attempts to Hold Parents Criminally Liable 
In various cases parents will not be financially responsible for the actions of their children.  One 
such case is if the child is an adult and emancipated.  In Carney v. Gambel, the Fourth District 
Court of Appeals in Florida held that “Generally, there is no duty to control the conduct of a 
third person to protect him or her from causing physical harm to another… an exception arises 
where a special relationship exists between the actor and the third person… the special 
relationship, however, must include the right or the ability to control another‟s conduct.”
130
  
Carney held the “the [d]efendants [parents of the adult child] may not be held legally responsible 
for the conduct of their emancipated, adult child… [the court recognized] that in those instances 
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where a special relationship has been found imposing liability on a parent for conduct of a child, 
the duty to exercise control is limited to a minor child.”
131
 
In instances where the parents of a child are separated or divorced only the custodial parent may 
be responsible for the child‟s actions.  This legal concept was demonstrated in Canida v. Canida 
where a divorced couple‟s minor child, Bradley Canida, vandalized school property.
132
  Under 
section 741.24, Florida Statutes (1997) the school district was entitled to recover damages “„from 
the parents of any minor under the age of 18 years, living with the parents, [when the child] 
maliciously or willfully destroys or steals property…‟ belonging to the school district.”
133
  The 
minor‟s father, Lyle Canida, moved for summary judgment regarding his liability, arguing that 
the statute intended to limit liability to the parent(s) who has actual custody of and control over 
the minor child.  The trial court granted the father‟s summary judgment motion and the mother, 
Christine Canida, appealed.  The first issues addressed by the court was “whether §741.24 
applies to both parents equally regardless of marital status or custody/parental responsibility 
circumstances, or whether it applies only to the parent with whom the child is living at the time 
of the offense.”
134
 At the time of this incident the minor, Bradley, was living with his mother and 
she had primary custody and control over the child.  The court “[agreed] with the lower court 
that the statute contemplates finding the mother liable for the child‟s offenses.”
135
  Canida also 
noted that “Section 741.24, Florida Statutes, was enacted in 1956… [And since then was] 
virtually unchanged.  [Citing Stang v. Waller, 
 
the Canida court held that] The statute was 
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intended to „aid in reducing juvenile delinquency by imposing liability upon the parents who 
control minors…‟”
136
  The court went on to determine that the statute was “in derogation of the 
common law and thus must be strictly construed in favor of the common law… As the Stang 
court observed, it is the crucial element of parental control over the minor child that indicates 
who will bear liability for the child‟s acts…  Where the parents are divorced and one parent 
necessarily has primary residential custody over the minor, that custodial parent has the 
immediate and day-to-day opportunity to exert his or her parental control and discipline of the 
resident child.”
137
  Appellant, Christine Canida, also argued that the plain meaning of section 
741.24, Florida Statutes (1997) as applied to the facts of this case must necessarily hold both 
parent liable because of the word „parents‟ is plural.  The Canida court decided that “Section 
1.01(1), Florida Statutes (1993) provides that „[i]n construing these statutes and each and every 
word, phrase, or part hereof, where the context will permit… [t]he singular includes the plural 
and vice versa.‟ [The court interpreted] that the word „parents‟ necessarily includes the singular 
„parent‟ as well.”
138
  Based on these reasons, the court in Canida reasoned that the language in 
the aforementioned statute excludes non-custodial parents from liability if he or she only has 
occasional visitation rights with the child.
139
 
There have also been cases from other states in the past where legislatures have attempted to 
hold parents criminally liable for the actions of their children.  In 1985 Wisconsin enacted 
legislation which made grandparents financially and criminally responsible for babies born to 
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their unmarried minor children.
140
  The criminal penalty was up to two years in jail.  Four years 
after this legislation was enacted, it was allowed to “sunset” after being applied to roughly 
fourteen grandparents.  The Wisconsin legislature found that it had led to greater parental 
pressure on their teenage children to have abortions and had lowered the rate of paternity 
establishments for such babies.
141
  This law was clearly passed as a rash attempt to control an 
ever growing problem in the state and, after deliberation, was found as faulty legislation. 
In 1988, California enacted the Street Terrorism Enforcement and Prevention Act.  This 
legislation had a misdemeanor provision permitting parents to be prosecuted and punished for 
certain illegal acts allegedly committed by their children where the parents had failed to control 
and supervise them.  By 1995 it was determined by the Los Angeles City Attorney‟s Gang Unit 
that the statute had sent nearly 1,000 parents to counseling or classes (presumably, under the 
threat of possible prosecution) and only two parents, both of which refused to cooperate with the 
Unit, were actually prosecuted.
142
  Many states have been reluctant to follow in California‟s 
footsteps due to the “slippery slope” theory that suggests that in addition to holding parents 
accountable for the serious acts of delinquency, authorities could criminally sanction a parent 
whose teenage child commits a status offense.
143
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CHAPTER V: THE INSURANCE FACTOR OF LIABILITY 
Basic Homeowner Insurance Principles and Terminology 
In regard to parental liability for actions committed by their children, it is important to analyze 
the possibility of recovery from available insurance coverage.  Recovery may be available from 
homeowner‟s insurance, whose coverage includes: Damage to the insured‟s residence and 




It is important to understand of the general principles that govern the interpretation of insurance 
contracts.  First, as stated in Praetorians v. Fisher, insurance contracts are typically interpreted 
by courts “in the manner most favorable to the insured and that statutes governing insurance 
contracts be liberally construed so as to protect the public.”
145
  Second, as mentioned in James v. 
Gulf Life Insurance Company, when interpreting insurance contracts, courts do not simply 
interpret a section of the contract, but rather interpret that portion of the contract “in connection 
with other provisions of the policy in order to arrive at a reasonable construction to accomplish 
the intent and purpose of the parties.”
146
 
By definition, insurance is “A contract by which one party (the insurer) undertakes to indemnify 
another party (the insured) against risk of loss, damage, or liability arising from the occurrence 
of some specified contingency, and [also] to defend the insured or to pay for a defense regardless 
of whether the insured is ultimately found liable… Insurance, or as it is sometimes called, 
assurance, is a contract by which one party, for a consideration, which is usually paid in money 
                                                 
144
 Garner, B. A., supra note 25. 
145
 The Praetorians v. Fisher, 89 So.2d 329, 333 (Fla.1956). 
146
 James v. Gulf Life Ins. Co., 66 So.2d 62 (Fla.1953). 
47 
either in one sum or at different times during the continuance of the risk, promises to make a 




In order to recover under an insurance policy there must be an injury or loss, which is “The 
violation of another‟s legal right, for which the law provides a remedy; a wrong or injustice… 
Injuries are divided into real injuries (such as wounding) and verbal injuries (such as slander).  
They may be criminal wrongs (as with assault) or civil wrongs (such as defamation).”
 148
 
This thesis focuses on a parent‟s civil liability for two forms of damage or injury caused by a 
child.  The first form is accidental or intentional property damage.  Accidental damage is covered 
under insurance policies and intentional damage is not.  This is because intentional damage is 
criminal in nature.  In part criminal property damage includes “Injury, destruction, or substantial 
impairment to the use of property (other than by fire or explosion) without the consent of a 
person having an interest in the property.”  A second definition, highlighting the intentional 
nature of the actor, states “Injury… to the use of property… with the intent to injure or defraud 
an insurer or lien holder.”
149
  The second form of damage is bodily injury, which is “[P]hysical 
damage to a person‟s body.”
 150
  Bodily injury also has a subcategory of „serious bodily injury‟, 
defined as “Serious physical impairment of the human body, [especially] bodily injury that 
creates a substantial risk of death or causes serious, permanent disfigurement or protracted loss 
or impairment of the function of any body part or organ.”
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Lastly, homeowner insurance policies provide coverage for „accidents‟, which are defined as 
“An unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence(s); something that does not occur in the 
usual course of events or that could not be reasonably anticipated… [and which are] not 
attributable to the victim‟s mistake, negligence, neglect, or misconduct.”
152
  To accommodate the 
layperson‟s understanding of this term, courts have more broadly defined an accident as “An 
occurrence which is unforeseen, unexpected, extraordinary, either by virtue of the fact that it 
occurred at all, or because of the extent of the damage.  An accident can be either sudden 




When discussing whether an injury is the result of an accident or intentional act, the difference 
between these two terms is not always clear.  In Allstate Insurance Company v. Travers the 
United States district court in northern Florida shed some light on this issue and distinguished the 
difference between an intentional and accidental injury by stating that “The general rule in 
Florida is that an „intentional injury‟ exclusion in a liability insurance policy does not apply to 
injuries caused by intentional acts, where the insured did not specifically intend to cause the 
injury which occurred… Under this rule, the insured‟s subjective intent to cause the result must 
be shown in order for an injury to be deemed an „intentional injury‟ under the exclusion.”
154
  
Therefore even if an insured‟s act is intentional, if they did not specifically intend to cause the 
resulting injuries and the injuries were not foreseeable, the insurer will still be liable to the 
victim.  Also, as stated above, the criteria that is commonly analyzed to evaluate an accident is 






 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Travers, 703 F. Supp. 911, 914 (N.D. Fla. 1988); also supported by Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. 
Thomas, 301 So.2d 158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1974). 
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It is also important to note that in cases where liability insurance is available and the insurer is 
forced to provide coverage, juries will be asked to determine the appropriate amount of monetary 
compensation the victim(s) of bodily injury damage should receive.  In part, juries are instructed 




Homeowner insurance policies typically cover all individuals who reside within a dwelling, 
including spouses and children of the policyholder.  In Philbin ex rel. Edwards v. American 
States Insurance Company an example of such a policy provision may include a definition of 
insured, in part as “(a) If you are designated in the Declarations as an individual: (1)You and the 
following residents of your household: (a) Your relatives.”
157
 
In Philbin the court decided that Appellant/Cross-Appellee, Timothy Philbin, was not entitled to 
indemnity from Appellee/Cross-Appellant, American States Ins. Co., for a judgment he received 
against William Curtis (the at-fault party) because William was found to not be included as a 
resident within the same household as the insured, Rosemary and Richard Curtis (William‟s 
parents).  At the time of the said incident William was renting the house from his parents who 
were living elsewhere.  This fact raised the court‟s attention to Sembric v. Allstate Ins. Co., 
which stated that “a policy with a resident family household member provision, requires that 
those members of the „household‟ dwell or live together on a permanent basis.”
158
  As such, 
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William was determined by the court as not being an insured of American States Insurance 
Company.  The separate residence would require a separate policy for coverage. 
Often, in instances involving parental liability, parents may not be able to pay the judgments 
ordered against them for the damages caused by the actions of their children.  In many serious 
cases where parents are sued vicariously for the acts of their children, the outcome results in 
huge settlements or judgments.  These outcomes are a result of the justice system‟s designed 
effort to properly compensate the victim(s).  Often, parents do not have the “deepest” pockets to 
recover from.  Fortunately, an answer may be found under the homeowners insurance policies 
carried by many families.  Although homeowner‟s insurance policies do not cover intentional or 
criminal acts, they do allow coverage for “accidents”.  Authority exists which interprets 
“accidents” to include acts of “negligence” on behalf of the policyholder, since negligence is not 
an intentional act.  Thus, as mentioned in the Illinois case Illinois Farmers Insurance Company 
v. Kure, if a parent is found to be negligent in supervising their child (or any other related 
responsibility owed to the child) a victim may recover from the parent‟s homeowners‟ insurance 
policy under an accident claim.
159
  In the Kure case, Matthew Kure (child of Thomas and Cindy 
Kure) had an altercation with Kyle Signorelli.  During the altercation Matthew executed a “pile-
driver” type of maneuver by lifting Kyle from the ground then driving Kyle‟s head into the 
ground with the weight of his body.  Kyle was paralyzed from the neck down.  Matthew 
Signorelli brought suit against the Kure family alleging that Matthew negligently injured him 
and that Thomas and Cindy Kure were negligent also for providing Matthew with the vehicle he 
used to travel to Kyle‟s house and for failing to control their child.  A separate count also existed 
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alleging willful conduct and battery against Matthew.  The Kure family sought coverage from 
their insurer, Farmers.  Farmers filed an action for declaratory judgment that it had no duty do 
defend or indemnify any member of the Kure family in this matter.  They based their action on 
three assertions, “(1) the Kures‟ policy covered occurrences, (2) the policy defined an 
“occurrence” as an accident, and (3) the injury did not result from an accident.”
160
  Farmers also 
argued that it had no duty to defend or indemnify based on Matthew‟s intentional conduct 
exclusion.  Farmers also contended that Thomas and Cindy were not covered because of 
Matthew‟s intentional conduct.  The trial court decided that Farmers had a duty to defend 
Thomas and Cindy, but not Matthew, and granted a partial summary judgment.  The appellate 
court affirmed the trial court‟s ruling. 
Interestingly, there have been attempts to hold parents liable for actions involving proper 
supervision of each other.  Once such case was Korhonen v. Allstate Insurance Company, where 
the plaintiff, the mother of a sexually molested daughter, sued defendants, husband and wife, 
under their homeowner insurance.
161
  The complaint alleged negligence on behalf of the wife for 
her lack of supervision of “the child who „accessed the alcohol [in their home] and became 
extremely ill as a result‟”, her negligent “[infliction of] emotional distress, first, by failing to 
learn that William [her husband] had… engaged in sexual acts with [Plaintiff‟s] daughter, and 
second, by verbally blaming, admonishing, and degrading the daughter and accusing her of 
lying.”
162
  This attempt to hold a spouse liable for negligence in the supervision of the other 
spouse, in part, was denied but is an interesting attempt that deserves attention when considering 
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the responsibilities policyholders have in regard to other insureds residing within their 
household. 
Contractual Ambiguity 
In Florida, courts enforce the principle that liability contracts must state their exclusions in clear 
and unambiguous writing.  If they do not, the courts will deem the contract ambiguous and rule, 
at its discretion, as to what the contract meant to say, typically in the favor of the insured as 
mentioned earlier in Praetorians v. Fisher.
163
  Ambiguity is best defined as “[An] uncertainty in 
meaning.  In legal documents ambiguity may be patent or latent.  A patent ambiguity is obvious 
to anyone looking at the document; for example, when a blank space is left for a name.  A latent 
ambiguity at first appears to be an unambiguous statement, but the ambiguity becomes apparent 
in the light of knowledge gained other than from the document.  An example is „I give my gold 
watch to X‟, when the testator has two gold watches.  In general, extrinsic evidence can be used 
to clarify latent ambiguities, but not patent ambiguities.  Extrinsic evidence cannot be used to 
give a different meaning to words capable of ordinary interpretation.”
164
 
One popular court interpretation that shares the same legal concept is Apgar v. Commercial 
Union Insurance Company where the court held that “the language in a contract of insurance is 
ambiguous if it is reasonably susceptible to different interpretations.”
165
  According to State 
Farm Fire and Casualty Company v. Steinberg, Florida law dictates contractual ambiguity with 
the following rationale “if the language in the contract is unambiguous, it governs.  If the 
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relevant policy language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing 
coverage and the other limiting coverage, the insurance policy is considered „ambiguous.‟”
 166
  
Finding precedent in Auto-Owners Insurance Company v. Anderson, the court in State Farm Fire 
and Casualty Company agreed that if a liability policy is determined to be ambiguous, it must be 
“interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the drafter who prepared the 
policy.”
167
  Thus, if a contract is found to be ambiguous the courts will interpret the contract for 
the parties and decide at its discretion (after reviewing the facts and evidence) the coverage of 
the policy.  As previously stated, a failure to state the exclusions clearly within the contract may 
expose insurers to liability that they may have wanted to exclude.  Courts have consistently 
interpreted liability exclusions (or a lack thereof) as provisions which are placed in insurance 
contracts intentionally and with purposefulness.  In Brown v. Travelers Insurance Company, 
“[W]hen a carrier has such freedom over the coverage it will insure, the non-presence of 
expressed intentions on discrete subjects should ordinarily be taken as purposeful non-inclusion 
of the intention.  The absence of the expression should mean the absence of the intent.  Thus the 
failure to write an exclusion from coverage… should be understood as a purposeful omission.”
168
 
Insurance Companies Liability Limits 
Insurers are free to limit their policies in many ways as long as the provisions within their 
contracts do not violate State statutes and/or public policy.  The decision of what is and is not 
against public policy is a careful distinction that courts are often asked to consider.  When asked 
to do so, courts treat the burden of determining public policy with carefully diligence.  As Justice 
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William Glenn Terrell, in Story v. First National Bank & Trust Company, mentioned as a 
popular saying “[Public policy is] a very unruly horse, and, when once you get astride it, you 
never know where it will carry you.”
169
  In France v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Company the 
Third District Court of Appeals in Florida stated that “In the absence of statutory provisions to 
the contrary, insurers have the right to limit their liability and to impose such conditions as they 
wish upon their obligations, not inconsistent with public policy and the court are without the 
right to add to or take away anything from their contracts.”
170
  Thus, insurers are free to limit 
their liability to accidents and make exceptions to their coverage by implementing specific 
conditions on the coverage they offer. 
Intentional or Criminal Conduct and other Public Policy Exclusions 
There are liability insurance coverage exceptions that are not at the insurer‟s discretion to 
exclude.  One such coverage is exclusion from coverage for the intentional or criminal actions of 
the insured.  In Ranger Insurance Company v. Bal Harbour Club, the Supreme Court of Florida 
held that the public policy of Florida prohibited insurer from being indemnified for loss resulting 
from an intentional act of religious discrimination.
171
  In accordance with the decision in Ranger 
Insurance Company, other cases have expanded this concept to also include other intentional and 
criminal actions.  One such case was Mason v. Sheriffs’ Self-Insurance Fund where the court, 
referencing Ranger Insurance Company, stated that “the general rule is that one may not insure 
against one‟s own intentional misconduct because the availability of insurance will directly 
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stimulate the intentional wrongdoer to violate the law.”
172
  Expanding on the concept that 
allowing insurance coverage for intentional and criminal actions would encourage such conduct, 
the Florida Supreme Court also had another reason for limiting insurance liability, as it found 
that such coverage would be against the State‟s public policy and insurance contracts cannot 
violate either State law or public policy.  In determining whether public policy would allow 
liability contracts to provide coverage for intentional or criminal conduct, as stated in Ranger 
Insurance Company, the courts look at two factors: “[1] the conduct of the insured (is it a type 
that will be encouraged by insurance?) and [2] the purpose served by the imposition of liability 
for that conduct [deterrence or compensate victims]… An examination of the first factor leads to 
the determination of whether the existence of insurance will directly stimulate commission of a 
wrongful act, and an examination of the second factor leads to the determination of whether 
deterrence or compensation should be given priority.”
173
  Thus, insurance coverage for the 
insured actor in cases involving intentional or criminal conduct will generally not be enforced by 
courts in Florida.  Although, as it pertains to multiple causation issues where injury ensued by 
the actions of more than one insured actor, there are cases outside of Florida that have affirmed 
the denial of coverage for the intentional acts of one party, but still ordered coverage for the 
actions of another that were found to be contributory to the damages suffered by the victim, i.e. 
negligence.  See Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Kure.
174
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Exceptions to the Intentional or Criminal Conduct Exclusion 
For some issues presented, there are no juvenile cases and therefore other cases must be 
examined for guidance.  There are exceptions to the legal principle that excludes insurance 
coverage for the intentional or criminal conduct of the insured.  One such exception was 
recognized in Ranger Insurance Company who addressed the issue by stating that “Florida… 
[has] allowed exceptions [to an insurer‟s coverage exclusion for an insured‟s intentional or 
criminal action(s)] only in individualized cases where innocent third parties were involved or it 
appeared unlikely that the wrongful act could have been produced by the prospect of 
coverage.”
175
  As explained above, the public policy doctrine that excludes insurance liability for 
intentional or criminal actions of the insured does not apply to third party beneficiaries; such 
inapplicability is exemplified by the case of Everglades Marina.
176
  In this case the Supreme 
Court of Florida held that public policy does not prohibit third-party beneficiaries of an insurance 
policy from recovery of benefits because the loss was intentionally caused by the criminal acts of 
an insured, when the insurance policy did not contain any express clause excluding such liability.  
Everglades Marina, Inc. involved Monroe Spodek, who was the president and sole stockholder 
of Everglades.  In March 1979 Mr. Spodek set fire to the business building, damaging it and the 
boats that belonged to appellees, American Eastern Development Corporation.  It was stipulated 
that Mr. Spodek intentionally and unlawfully set fire to the building.  American Eastern Dev. 
Corp. made claims to its insurance carrier, Royal Globe Insurance Company, which paid those 
claims and brought its subrogated claim against Everglades Marina and its insurer, Switzerland 
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General Insurance Company.  The appellant insurance company, Switzerland Gen. Insurance 
Co., argued that “the boat owners [American Eastern Dev. Corp.] were precluded from recovery 
on the basis of the public policy that an insurance company is not liable to indemnify its insured 
for losses directly incurred by the insured‟s fraud or misconduct, and the boat owners in this 
instance stand in the shoes of the insured.”
177
  Thus, they reasoned that Mr. Spodek‟s intentional 
conduct also applied as the actions of American Eastern Dev. Corp. and both were excluded 
from recovery.  The court did not agree with this argument made by Switzerland Gen. Insurance 
Co., stating that “[the court rejects] the request to extend the public policy doctrine to third-party 
beneficiaries of the insurance policy and, consequently, [also rejected] the assertion by the 
appellant insurance company that the arson of the marina owner should be attributed or imputed 
to the boat owners who had their boats stored within the premises.”
178
  In this case the policy 
with the expressly written clause excluding such coverage was contrary to public policy. 
An insured‟s mental condition at the time of incident may be another exception to the 
“intentional or criminal acts exclusions” of insurance contracts is some States.  In Florida, the 
landmark case decided by the state Supreme Court that addresses this topic is Prasad v. Allstate 
Insurance Company.
179
  In this case, Renuka Prasad filed suit against her mother, Chandra Palat, 
and her brother, Toreshwar Nauth, for injuries she sustained when Nauth viciously attacked her 
with a knife.  The incident occurred on a day when Prasad was visiting her mother who lived 
with her brother.  Prasad‟s brother was a treated schizophrenic.  Sometime during Prasad‟s visit, 
Nauth casually walked over to Prasad and started stabbing her repeatedly.  In her complaint 
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Prasad alleged negligence against Palat for her duty of care breach, since she “[K]new that her 
son was insane; that [Prasad] knew that her son had violent propensities, was in a deteriorating 
mental condition, unpredictable and dangerous, and suffering from paranoid schizophrenia; and 
that as a direct result of the son‟s failure to take his antipsychotic medication his mental 
condition was so severely deteriorated that he was legally insane and thus unable to form 
intent.”
180
  In count two, Prasad alleged that Nauth was also negligent by his “[A]wareness that 
he must take his antipsychotic medication, and his failure to do so, rendering him insane and 
incapable of formulating intent.”
181
  The Supreme Court of Florida was asked to answer the 
following three questions: “[1] Under Florida law, does the intentional acts exclusion of the 
policy in question apply in circumstances alleged in the state court complaint? ... [2] Are the 
injuries alleged in the state court complaint an „accidental loss‟ as described in the policy? ... [3] 
Does the criminal acts exclusion of the policy apply in the circumstances alleged in the state 
court complaint?”
182
  Prasad followed the court‟s earlier decision in Landis v. Allstate, where it 
determined that the intentional acts exclusion clause applied where an insured was acting under a 
diminished mental capacity and had sexually abused children in her home.
183
  In Landis the 
Florida Supreme Court held that “specific intent to commit harm is not required by the 
intentional acts exclusion.”
184
  As it pertains to the Prasad case, the issue was determined to be 
whether Nauth could form, and if he had at the time of the incident, the specific intent to commit 
the act; rather than whether he had the specific intent to commit the harm.  Prasad found that 
“[A] person who is considered insane may still be capable of entertaining the intent to commit 
                                                 
180
 Id. at 993. 
181
 Id. at 993.  
182
 Id. at 993. 
183
 Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So.2d 1051 (Fla.1989). 
184
 Id. at 1053. 
59 
certain acts, even if that intent is the consequence of a delusion or affliction.”
185
  The court 
attempted to give an example of its decision by stating that “an insane or mentally ill person can 
still make plans to harm another, going so far as to obtain the weapon to be used and to seek out 
the victim.  By any stretch of the imagination, the person „intended‟ the act against the victim, 
even if the person did not fully understand what he or she was doing at the time of the crime.”
186
  
In its decision, the Florida Supreme Court in Prasad noted the conundrum that could ensue with 
this ruling and explained by noting the: 
[A]pparent inconsistencies of finding that an individual intended a crime for 
purposes of this type of civil insurance claim but allowing that person to escape 
criminal liability by reason of insanity.  [Prasad went on to state]  That 
inconsistency, however, was appropriately addressed by the Virginia Supreme 
Court in Johnson v. Insurance Company of North America, where it stated: “On 
the surface, there appears to be a blatant inconsistency in concluding, as we do, 
that a person may be criminally insane when shooting another, and thus avoid full 
criminal sanctions, and yet that same individual can be denied insurance coverage 
because he „intended‟ to shoot his victim.  A more careful analysis, however, will 
reveal that there is no inconsistency at all.  In the law, there are many situations in 
which a person may intentionally injure or kill another and will not be subject to 
criminal punishment.  For example, an individual may kill in self-defense.  The 
executioner may kill with the sanction of the State.  A soldier may injure or kill 
under rules of combat.  This conduct is intentional, but it is also excusable.  
Likewise, an individual may be excluded from penalty if he is insane at the time 
he commits a criminal act.  As here, he may do the act with every intention of 
consummating it, but when it is shown that he was mentally ill, he is excused 
from the imposition of the usual sanctions.  „The absence of punishment, 
however, does not retrospectively expunge the original intention.‟”
 187
 
Through this rationale, Prasad found that Nauth‟s actions were intentional and Nauth was 
thereby not covered through the intentional acts exclusion of Allstate‟s contract.  For the reasons 
stated above the court answered the first question it was presented with in the affirmative and the 
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second in the negative (reference questions 1 - 3 mentioned above).  In regard to question three, 
the court determined that the answer hinged on whether there was proof of the allegation made 
by Prasad.  If she could prove that this incident was an accident by definition, the criminal acts 
exclusion in Allstates‟s contract would not apply to the claim against Palat, the mother.  As such, 
coverage for Nauth was excluded and coverage for Palat was determined as pending further 
litigation. 
Outside of Florida there exists authority contradictory to Prasad.  In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Barron, 
the Supreme Court in Connecticut determined that an insured‟s mental illness can negate intent 
for purposes of intentional conduct insurance exclusions.
188
  The incident in Allstate v. Barron 
occurred during the early morning hours of June 10, 1999.  That morning Kelly S. stabbed her 
husband, Charles S., to death.  Their nine year old daughter, Jessica M., was awakened by the 
screams coming from her parents‟ bedroom and ran to the room.  Jessica was then repeatedly 
stabbed by her mother, Kelly.  Jessica ran down the hall while being pursued by Kelly.  Kelly 
then doused herself, Jessica M. and a bedroom with gasoline, and set the house on fire.  Kelly S., 
Jennifer S. (nearly three years old at the time), Jonah S. (one and one-half years old at the time), 
died in the conflagration.  The only survivors were Jessica M. (who was able to flee the house) 
and Joshua S. (then two months old).  Kelly S. was a thirty one year old woman with a long 
history of psychiatric problems.  Through the testimony of her psychiatrist, Dr. Ann H. Kazarian, 
it was found that Kelly had been suicidal at times (including an incident in 1994 in which Kelly 
overdosed on Xanax and again in 1995 where she attempted to hang herself).  After Kelly‟s 
treatment, the psychiatrist‟s final diagnosis (given before the incident that occurred on June 10 of 
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1999) was that Kelly S. was severely depressed and not psychotic.  Kelly had previously stated 
to Dr. Kazarian that “[Kelly‟s] baby was gorgeous.  I force myself to smile.  He smiles back, but 
I can‟t feel it.”
189
  Kelly also described her husband as “a beautiful husband.”
190
  Dr. Kazarian‟s 
last meeting with Kelly occurred on July 2, 1998, where Kelly informed Dr. Kazarian that she 
had stopped taking her prescribed medications and that she now believed that her illness was a 
result of sin and that, if she followed the teaching of the Bible, she would recover.  Dr. Kazarian 
testified that the events that occurred on June 10, 1999 were “consistent with her diagnosis of 
bipolar disorder and were „the kind of thing that [Dr. Kazarian] worried about when [she] was 
taking care of [Kelly].‟”
191
  Dr. Kazarian also testified that a person diagnosed with bipolar 
disorder may be incapable of controlling their actions at times and understanding the 
harmfulness of their conduct.  Dr. Kazarian testified that, to a reasonable medical certainty, a 
diagnosis of bipolar disorder will progress without treatment and medication.  Finally, Dr. 
Kazarian concluded that due to her lack of continuing treatment with Kelly after July 2, 1998, 
she could not provide an opinion as to whether postpartum depression had impaired Kelly‟s 
ability to tell right from wrong, to control her actions or to form an intent during the events of 
June 10, 1999.  The defendants, Stephen C. Barron (the administrator of Kelly‟s estate), also 
presented the trial court with an affidavit from Dr. Walter Borden, another psychiatrist.  Dr. 
Borden reviewed the complaint and all related documents of the case and came to the conclusion 
that based on his review of the aforementioned documentation, “[His] opinion to a reasonable 
degree of medical probability, [was that] on June 10, 1999 Kelly was incapable of appreciating 
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the nature of her behavior, unable to control herself and incapable of forming rational intent to 
do the acts attributed to her.”
192
  The trial court went on to grant the plaintiff‟s, Allstate, motion 
for summary judgment by deciding that the defense, Kelly‟s estate, had not provided sufficient 
evidence that Kelly was “legally insane” at the time of the incident that would constitute a basis 
for denying the motion for summary judgment.  On appeal, the Supreme Court of Connecticut 
decided, in part, that the criminal acts exclusion is inapplicable when an insured lacks the mental 
capacity to form intent and cannot be convicted of a crime.
193
 
Joint Obligation Clauses 
In Florida, insurers may deny coverage for all policyholders if any “one” of the policyholders is 
exempt from coverage.  This liability exclusion is normally addressed in a contract‟s “Joint 
Obligation” clause.  In Hrynkiw v. Allstate Floridian Insurance Company, the Fifth District 
Court of Appeals in Florida decided that an intentional or criminal act exclusion clause in 
conjunction with a joint obligation clause will allow an insurer to deny coverage for all 
policyholders if one of them is found guilty of an intentional or criminal act.
194
  In Hrynkiw, a 
trial court decided that Appellee, Allstate, had no duty to defend or indemnify Robert and Mary 
Jane Thompson nor their minor son, Lon, in the underlying personal injury suit brought by 
Appellant, Jeffrey Hrynkiw.  Appellant alleged in his complaint that Lon willfully and 
intentionally committed a battery upon him when he obtained possession of a pistol belonging to 
his parents, Robert and Mary Jane Thompson.  Lou then proceeded to point the weapon at 
Appellant‟s head and fired at close range.  The bullet pierced Appellant‟s skull near the bridge of 
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his nose and exited behind his right ear.  The complaint went on to allege that Lon “intended to 
cause harmful or offensive contact… in that he fired the pistol at the victim‟s head and knew that 
such an act was substantially certain to result in harm or death.”
195
  The Appellant alleged that he 
was entitled to recover from Robert and Mary Jane Thompson‟s insurance based on their 
negligence in failing to safely store the pistol in their home and in failing to exercise parental 
control over Lon.  Appellant alleged that Robert and Mary Jane were aware that Lon was on 
probation with the State of Florida for violent behavior, that Lon had dangerous propensities and 
was unfit to use a firearm.  Upon Appellant‟s initial filing of a suit against the Thompsons, 
Appellee reserved its right to deny coverage, provided a defense and filed the instant declaratory 
judgment action naming both the Thompsons and Hrynkiw as defendants.  The Thompsons did 
not answer and Appellee moved for judgment on the pleadings.  The trial court entered judgment 
for Appellee. 
The exclusion clauses considered in Hrynkiw were read and considered by the court through 
strict interpretation because the court reasoned that since “exclusion clauses are generally 
considered contrary to the fundamental protective purposes of insurance… the courts give a strict 
interpretation… as opposed to the liberal interpretation accorded coverage provisions.”
196
  When 
determining the meaning and scope of these clauses, the courts read them not as though a legal 
scholar were attempting to understand the provisions, but as if a layperson were attempting to 
comprehend the meaning of the policy.  The joint obligation clause of the Thompsons‟ policy 
read, in pertinent part, “The terms of this policy impose joint obligations on persons defined as 
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an insured person.  This means that the responsibilities, acts and failure to act of a person defined 
as an insured person will be binding upon another person defined as an insured person.”
197
 
In looking to interpret this provision, the court in Hrynkiw referenced Allstate Ins. Co. v. Raynor, 
which provided an interpretation of a joint obligation clause as a provision which “forges the 
various parties insured by a policy into a joint and inseparable legal entity… [so that] when the 
conduct of one insured defeats liability protection for a given loss, the policy deprives all other 
insureds of liability protection for that loss, even if the loss was also proximately caused by one 
of those parties.”
198
  The same contract addressed intentional or criminal acts in a provision 
which read in pertinent part that “[The policy will] not cover any bodily injury or property 
damage intended by, or which may reasonably be expected to result from the intentional or 
criminal acts or omissions of, any insured person.”
199
 
The court decided that the everyday meaning of this provision is that policy does not insure 
against damages that an insured intentionally inflicted or that are reasonably expected to result 
from an insured‟s intentional or criminal acts.  The court noted the “the willingness of the courts 
to uphold intentional or criminal act exclusion clauses is premised on the jurisprudential maxim 
that no person should be allowed to profit from his or her own wrongdoing.  Lawyers and 
laymen alike generally understand that the public policy against insuring for losses resulting 
from intentional or criminal acts is usually justified by the assumption that such acts would be 
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encouraged, or at least not dissuaded, if insurance were available to shift the financial burden of 
the loss from the wrongdoer to the insurer.”
200
 
Through the strict interpretation of these clauses the court decided that they were clear and un-
ambiguous, thus both clauses were enforceable.  The court then proceeded to analyze whether 
coverage was excluded for the alleged negligent acts of the parents based on the intentional or 
criminal act exclusion provision in conjuncture with the joint obligations clause.  During the time 
period this case was heard, the court realized that Florida had not yet considered the appropriate 
application of the joint obligations clause to the intentional or criminal act exclusion clause, 
which was the main argument made by appellee; contending that they were immune from having 
to provide coverage under the rationalization that since Lon was excluded from coverage, so 
were his parents.  Looking to other jurisdictions for guidance, the court considered Allstate 
Insurance Co. v. Steele, a case from Minnesota.
201
  In the Steele case, the court stated that “such 
clauses [joint obligation] have… been consistently construed to mean that an insured‟s 
intentional act bars a claim against another insured for negligent supervision.”
202
  Hrynkiw also 
found Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co. analogous to its immediate case.
203
  It agreed with Landis that 
“in essence, regardless whether the immediate intentional act inflicts the injury or the antecedent 
negligence sets in motion the events that lead to that injury, it is the underlying cause of the 
injury – the intentional act for which all of the insureds are equally responsible – that determines 
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 Id. at 881. 
203
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its insured coverage based on the intentional act exclusion clause contained within their policy.  The court affirmed 
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coverage.  Hence the injured should not be allowed to circumvent the intentional act exclusion 
clause by filing a claim for negligence based on the same underlying intentional act that actually 
caused the injury.”
204
  The court found this rationalization “logical, reasonable and comport[ing] 
with Florida law.”
205
  Thus, Hrynkiw decided to treat the Thompsons and Lon as a “joint and 
inseparable legal entity” so that the act of Lon, in essence, became the act of the Thompsons for 
purposes of coverage under the policy from appellee.  Therefore, the trial court‟s decision 
granting judgment on the pleadings in appellee‟s favor was affirmed.  This landmark case in 
insurance law will have great impact in cases similar to Prasad, which as we discussed earlier 
involved a mother‟s liability for the actions of her insane son.  If ruled upon today, the parent 
might have been exempt from coverage purely on the basis of her son‟s intentional act. 
Other state courts disagree with the decision in Hrynkiw.  One case was C.P. v. Allstate 
Insurance Company.
206
  In this case from Alaska, Harold Lancaster, the adult son of 
homeowners Dolan and Eleanor Lancaster, physically and sexually assaulted the child of the 
plaintiff, C.P, an 11 year old girl.  The incident occurred during a sleepover C.P. attended at her 
friend C.L.‟s (Harold‟s daughter) residence.  At the time, C.L. and her father were living in the 
elder Lancaster‟s home.  The allegations brought forth by C.P. alleged that Harold assaulted her 
and that “the elder Lancasters were negligent in failing to disclose Harold‟s presence or his 
alleged propensity to assault children and in failing to watch over C.P.”
207
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These facts are similar to those in Hrynkiw, as they involve parental negligence allegations for 
the intentional conduct of the child.  The difference in the C.P. court decision is partially based 
upon the Doctrine of Reasonable Expectations, a doctrine which is not favored in Florida.  The 
doctrine, as applicable to insureds, was defined as “[t]he objectively reasonable expectations of 
applicants and intended beneficiaries regarding the terms of insurance contracts will be honored 




The court rationalized that this case involved multiple causation, and that C.P.‟s injury was 
contributed in part through the negligence of the elder Lancaster‟s and in part by the intentional 
and criminal acts of Harold.  The court decided that Allstate‟s contract was unclear and 
ambiguous in its liability coverage section when addressing incidents that involve both causes 
which would be covered or excluded, in other words multiple causes.  In its opinion the court 
referenced the contract‟s property loss exclusion, which it interpreted as excluding acts arising 
from multiple causes.  In part, the section the court considered stated: 
We [Allstate] do not cover loss to the property… resulting in any manner from: 
… 
7. One or more of the items listed below, if that item is one of two of more causes of a 
loss and if the other causes(s) of the loss is (are) excluded by this policy: 
a) Conduct, act, failure to act, or decision of any person, group, organization or 
governmental body whether intentional, wrongful, negligent or without fault.
209
 
The court in C.P. rationalized that “this exclusion makes it clear that there is no coverage for 
property losses in cases of multiple causes where all of the causes are excluded under the 
policy…  This clause demonstrates that Allstate knew how to address this multi-cause problem 
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when it wanted to.  No equivalent provision is to be found in Allstate‟s liability coverage.  The 
joint obligations clause does not address this issue.”
210
  After considering the property loss 
section, along with the rest of the policy, and comparing it to the liability section, the court in 
C.P. held that the language used by Allstate in its liability section was not clear and 
unambiguous.  It decided that the liability portion of the policy was ambiguous when addressing 
the exclusion of coverage in incidents that involve multiple causes.  Thus, the court held that 
Allstate‟s policy provided coverage to the elder Lancasters.  The court held that Allstate knew 
how to correct this issue and therefore, in accordance with Brown, had intentionally excluded the 
necessary verbiage from their liability coverage section.
211
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION 
Juvenile delinquency is a problem that may never be solved.  There will continue to be cases of 
children committing status and delinquent acts.  What society can do to mitigate these problems 
is find a means to deal with these children and their families collectively.  Sometimes the child‟s 
problem is a denouement of his experiences and lifestyle.  As discussed, a child may be more apt 
to act in a certain manner if their actions are either reinforced or ratified by the parents, or if the 
caregiver fails to provide them with adequate supervision or guidance.  In the event that parents 
or other caregivers fail in their duty to control and deter a child‟s misconduct, they may face 




Florida‟s long-standing rule regarding parental liability is that “a parent is not liable for the tort 
of his minor child because of the mere fact of paternity.”
213
  There are four exceptions to this 
legal concept.  The first exception is if the parent entrusts his child with an instrumentality which 
(because of the lack of age, judgment or experience of the child) may become a source of danger 
to others.
 214
  The second is where a child, in the commission of a tortuous act, is occupying the 
relationship of a servant or agent of its parents.
215
  The third is where the parent knows of his 
child‟s wrongdoing and consents to it, directs or sanctions it.
216
  The last exception occurs when 
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the parent fails to exercise parental control over his minor child, although he knows or in the 
exercise of due care should have known that injury to another is a probable consequence.
217
 
Several issues arise when parents are held vicariously liable for the actions of their child.  The 
first issue to analyze is due process.  It is difficult to justifiably hold someone accountable for the 
actions of another if they have no opportunity to defend themselves.  Juvenile courts in Florida 
have become aware of this problem and have attempted to correct it by including parents in 
delinquency cases.  They have been able to do this by requiring the State to file “Petitions for 
Parental Sanctions.”
218
  These petitions, in cases where the State pursues restitution, serve to 
notify the parents of the allegations against them and provide them with the opportunity to be 
heard in their defense.  This is accomplished through a “good diligence and good faith” hearing, 
thus satisfying the basic rights of due process.
219
  In cases where private lawsuits are brought 
against parents in civil jurisdictions (separate from the state), due process is not at issue as long 
as proper service occurs in the course of the lawsuit. 
Another problem with seeking restitution against parents is that courts may be lenient on parents 
of non-delinquent children.  To avoid liability, parents of children who have no criminal history 
must prove „good faith efforts‟ equivalent to abiding by their „normal parenting tasks.‟
220
  As for 
parents of delinquent child, they are required to prove „painstaking‟ efforts to control their 
children.
221
  It is important that society provide resources to parents of delinquents to assist them 
in their efforts to correct their child‟s misbehavior.  By holding parents liable if they do not 
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adequately supervise or guide their children, parents are forced to become more involved in their 
children‟s lives.  In theory, parental liability may have an adverse effect on parents of lower class 
families because of their lack of resources (according to the belief that lower class parents cannot 
devote as much time as would be necessary to correct their child‟s misbehavior).  To hold 
parents liable, it is important that they have access to the resources necessary to address the 
needs of their child.  This would allow plaintiffs to argue that the defendant parents were given 
ample opportunity to control their children and failed to do so.  This would also allow courts to 
justify ordering restitution or other related judgments against parents.  Until community 
programs are enhanced or parents are given more assistance in their efforts to correct their 
child‟s behavior, they will continue to escape liability by showing that they took even the most 
minuscule efforts to deter or correct their child‟s behavior.  It is also important to mention that 
plaintiffs in civil matters must connect the parent‟s negligence to the child‟s delinquent conduct 
in the complaint.
 222
  This is necessary for liability to be considered. 
Florida has no statutory caps on parental liability.  It is not unreasonable to infer that statutory 
limits on parental liability are created to punish parents, rather than to compensate the victims of 
crimes.
223
  Children who commit status offenses are also important to consider when discussing 
parental liability because they may become delinquent in the future.  Status offenders are 
difficult for courts to deal with because, in most cases, parents cannot be held liable for a status 
offense.  Courts have found it increasingly burdensome to deal with these children.  The courts 
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have a limited ability to enforce orders on to a status offender.
224
  Labeling a child as a status 
offender may insulate parents from liability for the children‟s future actions. 
Lastly, in civil lawsuits for the criminal actions of children, as in the Columbine High School 
massacre, plaintiffs have a heavy burden to prove parental liability.  Even when liability is 
proven, it is often difficult to recover large settlements or verdicts.  Many middle and lower class 
families do not have the funds necessary to satisfy large judgments.  Therefore, insurance plays a 
crucial role in compensation.  In Florida, insurers may not be liable for a child‟s intentional or 
criminal action.  In civil suits following delinquent actions, insurers may avoid liability toward 
negligent parents through “Joint Obligation” clauses or the insertion other multi-causation 
language into their contracts.
225
  This has led to cases where victims who receive huge 
settlements or judgments have no way to collect from negligent parents, even when they have 
liability insurance.  These insurance concepts have serious implications and might need to be 
revaluated.  Insurance laws might be changed to require insurers to provide coverage for 
contributing factors to damages, even when the damages are the proximate result of intentional 
or criminal actions.  State legislatures may want to re-analyze public policy to determine whether 
changes should be made.  If it finds that public policy demands that coverage denial under „joint 
obligation‟ or similar multi-causation exclusions are questionable, they may want to reconsider 
enforcing such insurance provisions. 
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